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ABSTRACT 
Samuel Huntington described the transformation process from an authoritarian 
regime to a democratic form of government as a direct transition.  This model of 
transformation was applied to Saudi Arabia to analyze if it is displaying characteristics 
that led other authoritarian regimes to democratization.  The relationship between the 
regime and the population is evolving and is facilitated by external and internal forces 
that represent an overall push toward democratization.  The internal pressures are a 
growing population, increasing educational levels, growing internet and modern 
technology usage, and an increasingly critical press. The external sources are the 
international political and economic world order, Islamic extremism, security concerns, 
and non-governmental organizations.  Several segments of society, including the ulama, 
merchants, technocrats, expatriates, tribes, and women are undergoing social changes that 
offer different political influences from what existed at the time of the creation of Saudi 
Arabia, and some of these groups demand more effective government.  Several earlier 
attempts at liberal reforms failed to produce a lasting commitment and left the Saudi 
monarchy in total control.  The social changes and internal and external forces will force 
the government to keep reforms in place to bring about an evolutionary change to a more 
liberal form of government. 
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Saudi Arabia is undergoing changes.  The population is growing and the 
education level is increasing.  The oil driven economy has not been able to meet the 
demands of the changing Saudi society and high unemployment rates leave the Kingdom 
open to a variety of internal and external pressures.  The Saudi monarchy instituted 
several changes in the political system to deal with the growing pressure, but are these 
changes cosmetic bandages or do they mark a trend that will lead to democratization?  If 
these changes mark a democratization movement in the kingdom, will the movement 
usher in a social revolution in the country that will slowly bring the Saudi polity to a free 
democratic state or will there be a political revolution that will upset the balance of power 
in the entire region?  
Samuel Huntington states that the third wave of democracy has five patterns of 
change.  Direct transition was one of these changes that occurred when a stable 
authoritarian regime switched to a stable democracy fueled by the institutions created by 
the ruling regime for stability.  Huntington discusses the democratization trend in Latin 
America, central Europe, and Southeast Asia, but the movement stalled in the Middle 
East.  If the world is experiencing the third wave of democracy, is Saudi Arabia a future 
candidate for a direct transition and will the change be evolutionary or revolutionary? 
 The research question is important for two reasons.  First, Saudi social, political 
and economic conditions are rapidly changing and a majority of the research concerning 
Saudi Arabia is outdated.  One aspect of the outdated research suggests that the Saudi 
monarchy will end when the oil money runs out.1  Although this hypothesis may be true 
in the long run, a forecast for greater future demand from developing countries like India 
and China eliminates the possibility that oil revenues will be insufficient for some time.  
In short, the current trend of oil demand will ensure the reign of the Saudi regime for 
many years if oil prices are the sole factor promoting change.  By considering the 
                                                 
1 Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani,  The Rentier State  (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 1-21; Terry 
Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 
quoted in Benjamin Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World 1960-1999,” 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr 2004): 232-246. 
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demographic and political changes in Saudi Arabia through a democratization lens 
provided by Samuel Huntington, not only can a more accurate analysis of the factors 
affecting the fate of the Saudi monarchy be obtained, but the character of the change can 
also be analyzed. 
Secondly, why is the character of the change in Saudi Arabia important?  Saudi 
Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East and is economically, politically, and 
militarily integrated into the region and internationally.  The Saudi monarchy is a firm 
US ally, but this position is increasingly unpopular in the region.  If the monarchy lost 
power by revolution, the world would witness a change in Saudi Arabia that might cause 
a shift in the regional power distribution similar to the power shift that occurred in 1979 
with the Islamic Revolution in Iran.  The past research assumes revolutionary change 
because political change in the region is normally revolutionary.  However, given the 
stability and resources in Saudi Arabia relative to other regional regimes, it is not clear 
whether change will follow the same revolutionary path.  The character of the change is 
important because changes in Saudi Arabia would likely mark changes throughout the 
region given their regional political position.  If these changes are evolutionary, this will 
influence other regional actors, and promote greater stability throughout the Middle East. 
Why is the research question important?  It applies democratization from a global 
perspective to the Saudi regime to examine the forces promoting change and predicting 
the character of the change.  Saudi Arabia is the strongest Muslim force maintaining 
stability in the region and it will be facing demographic changes that will stress the 
ability of even the most skilled politician.  Change is coming to the kingdom; the 
question is will it be evolution or revolution?  No past work addresses this concern. 
 The issues that are raised by the research are (1) the changing demographics of 
Saudi Arabian society and the stress it places on the political environment, (2) the 
political elements of Saudi society and their demands on and criticisms of the monarchy, 
and (3) the stability of the institutions created under monarchical rule.  Saudi Arabia’s 
population is growing by approximately 2% per year and the literacy rate is over 70% for 
men and women.  There is an increase of citizens traveling out of the country to get 
higher education from Western schools, but they are returning to an economy that is 
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dominated by the state and face an unemployment rate of approximately 25% (even 
higher for women). Most citizens are employed by a highly inefficient civil service 
system while others go into service oriented jobs in a private sector that makes up 40% of 
the economy.2  This combination creates stresses on the state dominated economy. 
 There are several political groups that compete for patronage and political 
currency.  They are separated into older groups (those which existed from the start of the 
kingdom) and the relatively newer ones.  The older groups are the religious 
conservatives, tribal sects, old merchant families, and the royal family.  The newer 
groups are technocrats, merchants that gained power during the oil boom, and women, 
who have considerable economic power, but have not been able to transfer economic 
power to political currency.  These groups are interacting in a society with loosened 
restrictions on the press and new technologies that are giving greater voice to dissenting 
opinions in the kingdom. 
The King recently created institutions that may solve some of the problems by 
giving power to lower levels of society.  These institutions include the Allegiance 
Commission and the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council).  The evolving relationships 
between the Saudi monarchy and the population are examined using Samuel 
Huntington’s direct transition framework described in The Third Wave:  Democratization 
in the Late Twentieth Century.  This examination will determine if the governmental 
changes will create stable institutions that will develop a more liberal government.  
Although many scholars suggest the Saudi Arabian monarchy will face revolutionary 
upheaval that has marked the Middle East when the population outgrows the ability of the 
monarchy to sustain it with revenues from oil, the recent institutions the Saudis are 
developing will provide the avenues necessary to conduct a progressive social evolution 
via a coalition of technocrats, merchants, and women that will not result in a revolution. 
This research will answer the following:  Are these institutions signs of a reform policy  
 
 
                                                 
2 “Saudi Arabia,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2116.html (accessed June 1, 2008). 
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that was instituted to meet social changes in Saudi Arabia, and are these changes 
evidence of a direct transition of an authoritarian regime evolving into a more liberal 
form of government? 
Several scholars agree that Saudi Arabia is headed for a change.  “Their 
population is not only growing at a rate that makes the maintenance of the oil welfare 
state problematic, but it is also becoming more literate, educated, and urban—all 
characteristics of other societies that have experienced political upheaval.” 3 The issue of 
succession is coming and there is no formal process to choose the king.  This opens the 
regime to feuding, but the short-term prognosis for regime stability is good, because it 
seems that there is enough oil money to keep the system working.4  The view that Saudi 
money is the reason the regime has survived does not account for political activity over 
the life of the monarchy that co-opted Islamic and tribal resistance into the government.  
The problems mentioned are historical signs of revolution, but the monarchy is giving 
more power to society as a whole and taking steps to expand the economy and create a 
stable environment that may not lead to a revolution, but rather a social evolution.  
The first problem of government in Saudi Arabia was is the process of choosing 
leaders does not ensure competent leadership or produce a formalized succession process 
to stem generational rivalry.  If the monarchy begins a feud it will be the end of the Saudi 
regime.5  This opinion was rendered prior to the creation of a council of royal family 
members whose purpose was to elect the leader of Saudi Arabia, and prior to the Basic 
Law which made all sons from King Abd al-Aziz’s branch of the al-Saud family eligible 
to rule.  An Allegiance Commission created by royal decree in October 2006 established 
a committee of Saudi princes that will play a role in selecting future Saudi kings,6 but the 
                                                 
3 Patrick Clawson, Eleanor Doumato, and Gause, F. Gregory, “Dialogue: Saudi Arabia,” SAIS Review, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, (Summer-Fall 2002): 199-228, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v022/22.2clawson.html (accessed June 1, 2001). 
4 Ibid.  
5 Patrick Clawson, Eleanor Doumato, and Gause, F. Gregory, “Dialogue: Saudi Arabia,” SAIS Review, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, (Summer-Fall 2002): 199-228, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v022/22.2clawson.html (accessed June 1, 2001). 
6 Simon Henderson, “New Saudi Rules on Succession: Will They Fix the Problem,” The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, (October 25, 2006). 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2526 (accessed October 19, 2008). 
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new system will not take effect until after Crown Prince Sultan becomes king.7  The 
Basic Law, which acts functionally as a constitution, was passed in 1992.  This expanded 
the pool of eligible Kings, which makes more talent available, and which can, in turn, 
lead to more capable leaders on the throne.  Whether this system of selecting a king will 
prevent rivalries that existed in European monarchies remains to be seen, but the 
Allegiance Commission and Basic Law formalizes the succession process and will give 
more of the royal family a formal leadership opportunity and stake in the monarchy.  
King Abd al-Aziz advised his sons to “avoid differences, beware if you separate.”8  The 
new institutions may not solve the problem, but the Saudi family is aware of the danger 
of division and there is a concerted effort supported by the “nobles” in maintaining the 
monarchy intact.9 
The second threat to survival is dependence on oil revenues.   This is the prevalent 
view of scholars describing the Saudi monarchy and the economic situation as a welfare 
state, rentier state, or distributive state.10  This view is summed up by Dirk Vandewalle. 
The creation of well-developed, coherent, and relatively independent 
economic bureaucracies are crucial to long-term economic development, 
but their creation for anything but distributive purposes is likely to be 
delayed in distributive states during boom periods.  In sum, the large role 
assumed by the state in distributive economies does not accurately gauge 
either its strength or its autonomy.  On the contrary, state participation is 
often an indication of weakness.11 
 
                                                 
7 Central Intelligence Agency, “Saudi Arabia,” Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html.  (accessed June 1, 2008); 
Rasheed, Madawi, “An Elected King in a Gerontocracy” (Personal website, Dec. 31, 2007)  
http://www.madawialrasheed.org/index.php/site/more/141/ (accessed June 23, 2008). 
8 Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, “House of Saud,” Frontline, DVD, directed by Jihan el-Tahri (Alexandria, 
VA: PBS Video, 2005). 
9 Patrick Clawson, Eleanor Doumato, and Gause, F. Gregory, “Dialogue: Saudi Arabia,” SAIS Review, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, (Summer-Fall 2002): 199-228, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v022/22.2clawson.html (accessed June 1, 2001). 
10 Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani,  The Rentier State  (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 1-21; 
Terry Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997) quoted in Benjamin Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World 1960-1999,” 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr 2004): 232-246. 
11 Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), 17-38. 
 6
In short, the Saudi monarchy continues to remain in power because of the money 
generated from oil revenues.  When the population requirements exceed oil money, the 
regime will not be able to quell the masses. 
Although money is an important reason why the Saudi monarchy has survived, it 
is not the only reason.  The monarchy made political decisions to incorporate Islam and 
tribalism into the government, which stabilized the regime during “bust” periods in the 
oil market.12  Money played an important part in the patronage system, but the regime 
extracted legitimacy and support from these segments of society to aid in their survival, 
while quelling these movements when they overstepped their bounds.  The European 
model intertwined state-making with the ability to wage war, provide services, and 
extract from the population.13  Saudi Arabia does not fit the Tilly model because the 
population is not taxed.  The Saudi regime does not extract taxes or services from the 
population, but society and the ruling class are not isolated from one another because 
Islam and tribalism forms a link between the state and the population. 
Tribal ties helped people politically and economically and Islam played a vital 
role in state formation by sedentarizing the nomadic tribes and providing legitimacy to 
the royal family. They “developed significant support for the existing political systems in 
the Gulf monarchies, while losing much of the ability they had in the past to challenge 
those systems.”14  Tribal political influence faded when the population urbanized, but 
tribal values and Islam play an important part in Saudi Arabian identity.  This dissenting 
opinion portrays the Saudi governmental institutions stronger than contemporary scholars 
suggest because it takes into account the process in which societal identities have been 
incorporated into the government. 
The final threat to the survival of the regime is the changing population.  The 
population is becoming more literate, urban, and educated.  Segments of society are 
                                                 
12 Benjamin Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World 1960-1999,” American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr 2004): 232. 
13 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” quoted in Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer and Peter Evans, Bringing the State Back In (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
171-191. 
14 F. Gregory Gause and F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in 
the Arab Gulf States (New York:  Council on Foreign Relation Press, 1994), 3. 
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changing including:  the ulama, technocrats, tribes, expatriates, merchants, and women.  
No one group is monolithic in their support or opposition to the royal family.  The 
religious conservatives are tied to the historical forging of the country, but they also form 
the greatest opposition to the royal family.  The ulama that were co-opted into the 
government provide religious legitimacy to the royal family and support government 
policies in return for control of conservative social issues.  More extreme religious 
elements defy the established ulama by protesting the foreign presence and introduction 
of Western culture and religions, while some religious groups support Western 
concepts.15  Technocrats educated in Western universities represent about 8% of society 
and are mostly concentrated in the lower levels of government.16 They favor a 
progressive movement to take power from the royal family to transform it into a Western-
style government, but they do not want to take power away by revolt because this would 
favor an Islamic fundamentalist-backed government. 
 Tribal elements helped Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud consolidate the kingdom.  Once the 
kingdom was consolidated, they lost their usefulness. Moreover, the monarchy has 
undermined tribal ties.  Their position in the government is relegated to the Saudi 
Arabian National Guard.  The erosion of tribal influences in Saudi society reduced the 
individual’s dependence on tribal identity.  This eliminated a large impediment to 
independent thought which is crucial in a free society.  Expatriates generate little 
domestic friction, but they receive international attention and do have some sway over 
domestic policy, such as when the royal family tried to implement income tax and many 
expatriates resigned, causing the royal family to rescind the decree.  Merchant families 
are mostly business oriented and support the family because while the family is in power 
their position is protected.  The family has also increasingly participated in the economic 
scene with the merchant class, something the merchants have found extremely 
displeasing.17 
                                                 
15 Madawi Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2002), 176-
186. 




Saudi women are also an important political force in the region, but they do not 
have the political power their economic and numerical means warrant.  Eleanor Doumato 
explains their situation: 
The reason is two-fold.  First, Saudi Arabia’s social fabric was not 
disturbed by a colonial experience; western influence is of a very recent 
date and has arrived, to some degree selectively, by the Saudis’ own 
choosing.  Second, social conventions and religiously based attitudes 
supporting sex-segregation, female domesticity and dependence on men 
have been incorporated into public policy.18 
 
Women’s roles in Saudi society are the most rapidly changing dynamic.  Women have 
moved from being solely child bearers, to productive members in the economic sectors of 
society.19  In 2005 the Saudi minister of labor made “job opportunities available for the 
Saudi woman … to enable them to join the establishments of the private sector, provided 
that the recruitment of the woman suits her nature and does not run counter to the 
teachings of the Islamic Shariah and the deep-rooted traditions of the Saudi society.”20  
Any progressive movement in Saudi Arabia will require support from women to succeed 
and will therefore have to address the role of women in society. 
 To accommodate the changing society, the Saudi regime has taken several 
actions.  Politically, a Consultative Council (150 members and a chairman appointed by 
the monarch for four-year terms), was announced in October 2003. This had been 
planned in the 1992 Edict.  The royal family intends to introduce elections for half of the 
members of local and provincial assemblies and a third of the members incrementally 
over a period of four to five years, but no such elections had been held by the end of 
2008. Economically, the government promotes growth in the private sector and has 
focused on a Saudization policy to increase the number of Saudi nationals in the local 
economy.  Unemployment is high because the population’s educational training and 
                                                 
18 Eleanor A. Doumato, “Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia,” British Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, (1992): 34. 
19 Sandra Mackey, The Saudis:  Inside the Desert Kingdom.  (New York:  W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2002), 143-168. 
20 Saudi Arabia Market Information Resource and Directory, “Plans to provide more Job 
Opportunities for Women,” (August 13, 2005), http://www.saudinf.com/main/y8526.htm (accessed July 2, 
2008). 
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technical skills do not meet the demands of the private sector. In response, the 
government increased spending on job training and education.21 
In what Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama called “the King’s dilemma,” 
the centralization of power required to undertake social and economic transformation 
discourages monarchs from expanding their social base and prevents them from 
accommodating the political demands of the new social groups that are produced by the 
very same social and economic change.22  The Saudi regime is facing these social 
changes that have led to upheavals in other countries, but the question is: Will social 
changes occur without resistance from the government, or will the government try to hold 
back the changes, inciting revolution revolution?  Manfred Halpern’s examination 
revealed more flexibility from monarchies, in principle, because the monarchs had the 
option to limit their own prerogatives, but he was not optimistic that the Saudis would do 
so.23  The literature, as a whole, suggests the Saudi monarchy will end when the money 
runs out, but the regime has proven to be resilient in boom and bust periods and enjoys 
legitimacy from tribal and religious elements of a society ingrained at the creation of the 
modern Saudi state.  Revolution as the norm in the region potentially serves as an omen 
that Saudi Arabia will experience the same fate rather than an evolutionary change.  
However, incorporating greater swaths of the royal family and population into the 
political process, conducting reform in the educational and economic system, bending to 
internal and external pressures, and acknowledging and combating the social changes in 
the society suggest a regime facilitating evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. 
Huntington asked two questions.  “To what extent would the third wave go 
beyond the first and second waves?  Would countries that had not experienced 
democracy in the past become stable democracies in the future?”24  Huntington listed a 
                                                 
21 Central Intelligence Agency, “Saudi Arabia,” (1999), http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/ 
wofact99/263.htm; CIA “Saudi Arabia,” (2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/. 
22 Lisa Anderson, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 1, 2 (1991): 2. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave:  Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Oklahoma:  
University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 44. 
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set of factors that other researchers cited as promoting democratization including:  a high 
overall level of economic wealth, a relatively equal distribution of income and/or wealth, 
a market economy, a feudal aristocracy at some point in the history of the society, the 
absence of feudalism in society, a strong bourgeoisie, a strong middle class, and high 
levels of literacy and education.  Some of the factors mentioned are apparent in Saudi 
society, but Huntington emphasizes that no certain combination of factors can be said to 
exist in every country where a democracy blooms.25  Huntington’s direct transition 
process stated that an authoritarian regime would create institutions that made the regime 
more stable.  These institutions would then be the foundation of the change to a 
democratic government.  The factors that created the impetus for change were new 
policies of external actors, declining legitimacy, transformation, and economic growth.  
Historical and current developments in the monarchical rule in Saudi Arabia, the 
changing sections of Saudi society, and external and internal pressures on Saudi 
governance are discussed to analyze their relation to the factors observed in direct 
transition democracies.  These developments are then classified as evolutionary or 
revolutionary to investigate the possibility of Saudi Arabia going through an evolutionary 
change to a more liberal society by means of direct transition. 
The first chapter discusses the evolving role of the Saudi Arabian government’s 
leadership and governing process.  It concentrates on the royal family by analyzing the 
historical creation of Saudi Arabia and discusses the institutions developed during the 
formation of the modern state.  It focuses on the development of the royal family, the 
ulama, and the military as Saudi governmental institutions, defines their relationships 
with each other, and discusses key events that altered the relationship of the governing 
body with the population. 
 The second chapter discusses individual segments of society that have changed 
since the creation of Saudi Arabia and their political demands and criticisms of the 
monarchy.  The groups include the ulama, tribes, merchants, expatriates, technocrats, and 
women.  Each group’s political power and tendency to support liberal reform is assessed.  
                                                 
25 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave:  Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Oklahoma:  
University of Oklahoma Press, 1993) 38. 
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This chapter reveals a society where merchants, technocrats, and women are gaining 
more power and will inevitably push for a more liberal society. 
The third chapter discusses external and internal pressures on Saudi Arabia.  
These include changes in per capita GDP, education, population size, and unemployment 
levels, the international community, the internet, satellite TV, non-governmental 
organizations, Islamic fundamentalism, and security concerns.  The present conditions 
are discussed and an assessment made to show how these changes affect Saudi society.  
This chapter demonstrates that the Saudi society is exhibiting social changes from 
external and internal pressures that will push for a direct transition from authoritarian rule 
to a more liberal governing process.  The conclusion will summarize the comparisons, 
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II. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF LEADERSHIP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The House of Saud has a long history on the Arabian Peninsula.  In many ways, it 
is one of the last standing monarchies dominated by the original ruling family.  This feat 
was achieved due to the absence of a hegemonic power.  The Ottoman Empire controlled 
the east and west coastlines of the Arabian Peninsula, leaving the interior untouched.  The 
Mongol Empire also neglected the heart of the peninsula.  The rough terrain and scarce 
water supplies made the region unwelcoming and undesirable for the exertion of direct 
control.  The Prophet Mohammed consolidated the area under the flag of Islam, and this 
influence lasted until the middle of the 13th century.  From here, the area was isolated 
from the developing Muslim Empire.  The region also escaped the ancient Persian, 
Greek, and Roman Empires.  The absence of an empire’s control affected the region in 
two profound ways.  First, social dimensions in the community were virtually unmolested 
except by Muslim influence.  This led to a deep link to Islam and promoted religious 
homogeneity.  The second was a lack of accountability to central power.  This left the 
tribal element the strongest social link between individuals.  These two variables would 
shape the eventual character of the state that emerged in 1932. 
 The tribal element of the developing society played out on many levels.  The tribe 
controlled every aspect of the individual’s life.  A man could not marry without the 
tribe’s consent.  One’s possessions could not grow without the tribe’s vital resources.  
The individual could not fend off attack from rival tribes without the backing of his 
own.26  It is no surprise that the tribal conflict of the mid 18th century produced the 
eventual architects of the state.  The al-Saud attempted to consolidate the peninsula 
against rival tribes such as the al-Rashid.  The al-Saud managed to take control of the 
interior and tried to extend its power to Mecca and Medina.  These were important 
because they were centers of trade and the birthplace of Islam.  As long as the fighting 
                                                 
26 Sandra Mackey, The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom (New York:  W.W. Norton and Company, 
2002), 109-112. 
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was contained in the interior, the exploits of the tribe were largely ignored by the 
Ottoman Empire.  As soon as the resistance reached the periphery of Ottoman controlled 
land, the Empire decapitated the rebellion and the head of the House of Saud.27  This 
marked the end of the first al-Saud conquests, but they would not be the last.  Two more 
attempts led to the creation of the Saudi state three hundred years later. 
 The religious element played a similar role in the development of the region.  Pre-
Islamic history in the region depended on the tribe, but religion supplied a different 
approach to life.  In some ways, the rise of Islam presented a strong resistance to tribal 
influences.  The tribal leaders subscribed to a form of pagan religion that did not limit 
their power and authority.  The strict regimen presented by Islam formed the first 
structural challenge to the tribal system.  The tribe formed the identity of its members, 
but Islam sought to define a different relationship.  Islam proposed that the master of man 
was God and all other entities fell short of his dominance.  Islam also proposed 
inheritance rights for women and better treatment of female children and orphans.  This 
did not eliminate the tribal system.  The tribal system incorporated the religion and the 
combination of the two changed the inner workings of the society.28 
 The way the tribal system changed Islam is evident in the version of Islam that 
emerged.  This version is an austere form of Islam that rebuked the itjihad, religious 
discourse, which ended in the 13th century.  The strict form of Islam suited the harsh 
realities of desert life.29  The first rise of the al-Saud tribe depended heavily on soldiers 
conformed to the Wahhabi teachings from the Nadj.  This alliance between al-Saud and 
Wahhabism would survive over time.  The type of leaders formed from the tribal and 
religious connection lasted to the new state, and isolation from the developing empires of 
antiquity and the Middle Ages stalled the social changes experienced elsewhere on the 
Arabian peninsula. 
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The tribal and religious elements in society helped forge two kingdoms and 
elevated many leaders to power in Saudi Arabia.  A successful leader was usually the 
most effective alliance builder.  The process of choosing leaders has evolved, which is 
evidence of a shifting relationship between the royal family and Saudi Arabia as a whole.  
The salient juncture in the House of Saud’s system of succession of power occurred in 
1992 under King Fahd.  The 1992 Edict, which created The Basic Rule of Law, was an 
inflection point in the decision making process to determine the leader of Saudi Arabia.  
This chapter investigates Saudi succession prior to 1992 to form a historical analysis of 
the succession process and examine the structure of the government.  The 1992 Edict and 
Allegiance Commission are discussed to reveal the changes in the succession process and 
project long term effects on the system of government.  The role of the family and other 
elements of the government have evolved since Mohammad ibn Saud from a hostile 
desert carnage to a complex political alliance system which resembles the behavior of 
modern political parties and legislative bodies.  This formal structure fits into 
Huntington’s transformation model, which observed voluntary power erosion by 
nondemocratic leaders in favor of democratic processes. 
B. MUHAMMAD IBN SAUD 
 Running Saudi Arabia was a family business.  The Saudi Arabian flag bears the 
name of the House of Saud.  The very name of the state is evidence that no one in the 
kingdom, or the entire world, disputes that Saudi Arabia is the house that Ibn Saud built.  
The modern state was created in 1932, but the journey which led to the domination of the 
Arabian Peninsula began much earlier.  The first attempt to control the region began with 
Muhammad ibn Saud in the mid 18th century.  The house of Saud made a pact with 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab which proved beneficial for both parties.  Al-Saud, 
which will be referred to as Saud1744 to mark the date of his original pact with al-
Wahhab and not to confuse him with later progeny of the same name, was fighting a 
battle with rival tribes in the region to spread his influence.  The pact made between the 
two coupled a religious fervor from al-Wahhab, with the political and military prowess of 
Saud1744.  He gained power in al-Diriyah and his successors expanded his original gains 
to much of what is presently known as Saudi Arabia.  The small gains carved out in the 
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unforgiving political landscape in al-Diriyah were enjoyed and expanded by Saud1744’s 
oldest son and successor, Abdul Aziz, and his successor and oldest son, Saud, because 
they continued to conduct successful military campaigns.  The success of the campaigns 
limited the legitimacy of competitors vying for control in the region.  Saud ibn 
Muhammad groomed his son to be the next leader, but the expansion of Saudi territory 
alerted the Ottoman Empire to a growing threat in the region and Muhammad Ali of 
Egypt was authorized to crush the rebellion.  This is known as the First Saudi Kingdom 
and it ended with the beheading of Abdullah, the great grandson of Saud1744, in Egypt.30 
 The second Saudi kingdom arose after the Ottoman Empire lost interest in the 
interior peninsula.  This gave rise to Turki bin Abdallah’s attempt to control the region.  
Turki was able to consolidate power and gain control in Riyadh, but his reign and lineage 
were interrupted by a series of internal and external threats.  The second kingdom ended 
in 1891 with the ejection of the al-Saud from Riyadh by the al-Rashid.  Although the al-
Rashids were formidable adversaries to the al-Saud, dissension in the al-Saud tribe, and 
overall weak leadership, contributed to the demise of the second kingdom.  Abd al-
Rahman, now the head of the al-Saud, fled to Kuwait, which would be the future staging 
point for his descendants to start the third kingdom.31 
 The important lesson from the first two kingdoms was there was always 
competition for leadership and alliances were crucial for stability.  The smoothest 
transition of power occurred during the first kingdom.  Saud1744 passed the mantle of 
leadership to his eldest son and his eldest son passed it to his eldest son.  This was a 
smooth transition because the former leader designated the next generation of leadership 
and the next generation conducted successful military campaigns.  The successful 
expansion led to greater prestige, which reduced the legitimacy of competing family 
members.  Competing claims to the thrown came from uncles of the new leader because 
age equated to experience and carried a natural prestige in tribal politics.  The successful 
military conquest was the main reason the uncles’ claims to power were held at bay. 
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 The second kingdom was plagued with assassinations, civil wars, and insidious 
plots to gain power.  The second kingdoms’ failure pointed out the strengths in the first 
kingdom.  Land conquest started in Riyadh and expanded to Hasa.  The time between 
1824 and 1891 was the date of the second kingdom.  Turki was able to gain control in 
Riyadh in 1824.  Abd al-Rahman was the last ruler eventually exiled to Kuwait once the 
al-Rashid tribe gained dominance from the northern Najd and took control in Riyadh.  
The al-Saud had roughly six leaders, but eleven power changes took place.  The constant 
power changes hurt the al-Saud because they could not build an alliance to effectively 
defeat internal and external rivals.32  The successful land conquest of the earlier leaders 
could not be duplicated due to the growing al-Rashid power and the continued Ottoman 
presence in the Hijaz so the former “territory legitimacy” was not there.  The sheer 
competition opened the door to the al-Saud capitulation to the al-Rashid, but the 
competition would eventually lead to the strongest al-Saud family branch vying for 
power in the later empire.  The failure of the second kingdom also demonstrated the 
crucial importance of alliances. 
C. KING ABD AL-AZIZ 
 The rise of the modern kingdom started with Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman ibn 
Saud in 1902.  Abd al-Rahman was exiled in Kuwait after the al-Rashid tribe took over 
Riyadh.  From Kuwait, he conducted several unsuccessful military operations to regain 
power in the Nadj. 33  Unable to accomplish his desired return to power, he relinquished 
his power to his son Abd al-Aziz, who will be referred to as Ibn Saud.  Ibn Saud learned 
from his family’s successes and failures and desired to restore his ancestral claim on the 
peninsula.  The most important lesson he learned was the value of alliances, both internal 
and external, as evidenced in the process he used to garner support and return to the 
Nadj.34 
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The first alliance he solicited was that of the Kuwaiti tribe which provided 
support because they believed the al-Rashid tribe was a mutual threat.  With this alliance, 
and 40 men, he conducted a surprise attack on Riyadh and regained control.35  After 
Riyadh, Ibn Saud was able to conquer as far north as Qasim.  Ibn Saud was able to get 
backing from the British as his adversary received Ottoman support.  He was able to fight 
the war to a stalemate, but the territorial conquest was a clear success because it roughly 
divided the Nadj in half.  After a tenuous treaty was signed with the rulers of the northern 
Nadj, he turned his military toward the east and consolidated his power in Hasa.  After 
World War I, the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, but the British continued to support Ibn 
Saud.  By 1921, Ibn Saud was able to capture Hail.  The rest of the peninsula submitted 
to Saud rule by 1925 through a number of well executed military operations and a clever 
strategy soliciting tacit approval from the British.  In the end, the Hijaz, Asir, Nadj, and 
Hasa were consolidated for the first time since Saud1744, and Mecca and Medina were 
under Saud control. 36 
The external alliance developed with Kuwait and Britain allowed Ibn Saud to 
eliminate outside interference in forging the Saudi State, but he also made internal 
alliances with the mutawwaa and the ikhwan which promoted his success.  The 
mutawwaa were the religious “specialists” of the Nadj.  They were trained in the 
teachings of al-Wahhab, but they mostly enforced the ritualistic aspects if Islam such as 
prayer, zakat, and the hajj.37  They also had a strong belief in tawid, oneness of god, and 
rejected innovations to Islamic doctrine.  The mutawwaa taught that a leader was a 
legitimate imam to the community if he upheld proper religious traditions.  The definition 
of this type of loyalty to a leader formed a necessary foundation for legitimacy for Ibn 
Saud.  The relationship between Saud1744 and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was a 
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salient point for the mutawwaa’s support of Ibn Saud and they saw his conquest as an 
opportunity to spread their form of Islam.38 
The ikhwan were a product of the mutawwaa teachings.  The Nadj was a 
conglomerate of nomadic tribes that were very leery about surrendering allegiance to any 
leader not related to the tribe.  The mutawwaa were able to sedentarize portions of the 
tribe and indoctrinate them into their religious beliefs.  Once the partnership was made 
with Ibn Saud, they taught the tribesman that he was the legitimate imam of the 
community and they owed him their loyalty and zakat.  This was crucial as a mechanism 
for state building because the main opposition to any ruler that tried to assert control of 
the region was the autonomous tribal system.  The teachings of the mutawwaa established 
a linkage with Ibn Saud and the tribes.39  Ibn Saud was able to draft soldiers from this 
new political alliance and form an army to supplement his other forces.  This army, and 
the system of allegiance to the tribal elements of the region, was crucial to conquering the 
Nadj and Hasa and establishing an effective taxation and loyalty system. 
The alliance with the mutawwaa and ikhwan was effective and tenuous.  It was 
effective because it incorporated two strong political forces in the region, but it was 
fragile because they did not share the same view of the expanding kingdom.  Ibn Saud 
viewed the expansion of the Saudi kingdom as just that, the expansion of Saudi control 
over the region.  Conquering the Arabian Peninsula became an al-Saud endeavor, the 
latest chapter of an ongoing saga.  The mutawwaa viewed it as an expansion of their form 
of Islam, which meant that their primary purpose was to convert new realms.  This view 
sparked resistance in newly acquired territory.  The Hasa had Shia populations which 
came under strict religious scrutiny and the Hanafi followers in the Hijaz encountered the 
same hostility.40  To the mutawwaa, this conflict was necessary to spread their religious 
views, but Ibn Saud did not believe the oppression was beneficial because of the unrest it 
created. 
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The ikhwan viewed the expansion as an opportunity for them to consolidate their 
own prosperity.  Several tribal leaders hoped for a high post or new land in the Saudi 
domain.  They saw themselves more as partners in the conquest rather than tools of the 
conquest.  The coalition between the mutawwaa and ikhwan demonstrates the challenges 
Ibn Saud faced in governing, and the eventual friction between segments of society that 
would have to be addressed to form an effective government.  First, Ibn Saud had to gain 
legitimacy.  The way he gained legitimacy in the first stage of conquest was from his 
family name and tribal affiliation, and the alliance between his descendant and al-
Wahhab.  This allowed him to consolidate power in the Nadj.  He built on this legitimacy 
in later expansions by the use of force. 
The next challenge Ibn Saud faced was transforming the alliances into a stable 
government.  The region had powerful political players that kept it fragmented.  To 
succeed in consolidating the region under one central government, Ibn Saud co-opted 
segments of society.  The first was the mutawwaa.  He gained their support and in return 
gave them control over religious matters.  The second was the tribes.  The mutawwaa 
taught the tribes he was the legitimate leader and they gave him their support.  The third 
way was he married many times to create alliances between different families and 
tribes.41  He thought that if the powerful challengers to his reign had a stake in his 
kingdom, they would be more apt to support him rather than seek his demise.  Fourth, he 
formed external relationships that effectively let internal force decide the affairs of the 
region.  He learned this from the earlier failures of his ancestors and chose his conquest 
wisely to not invite outside intervention.  Lastly, he solidified family backing.  The 
second Saudi state was weakened by family rivalry and he was determined to eliminate 
this impediment.  He was not able to completely stave-off family resistance as evidenced 
by the uprising of a rival branch of the family that was put down by force,42 but he was 
more successful than the second kingdom.  He did this through marriage, patronage, and 
monetary gifts. 
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There are three institutions that come out of the reign of Ibn Saud.  The first was 
the royal family.  The king was the supreme decision maker, but the family had political 
capital.  This was evident because it was necessary to co-opt branches of the family by 
internal marriages and monetary patronage systems to get political support.  The family 
ran Saudi Arabia because they were placed in all the political offices from the 
governorships to military and foreign policy positions.  This system gave the family a 
vested interest in the success of the king and also revealed the necessity of keeping the 
family satisfied, which promoted good governance by the king.  The second institution 
was the mutawwaa, which acted as the religious organization or ulama.  The mutawwaa 
were successful in helping Ibn Saud garner support from the masses to raise armies and 
promote a lawful society, but they also served as a strong check to the king’s power.  The 
king filtered decisions through the religious establishment to ensure he had their 
support.43  The religious organization also collected zakat, which was like a modern day 
tax collector, and functioned as the judicial branch.  The modern religious organization 
transformed itself into a formal branch of the government used by King’s of Saudi Arabia 
to root out dissent and promote proper governance.44 
The last organization was the military forces.  From its conception, the military 
was a tool to promote political goals rather than a force with political power to influence 
government policy.  The ikhwan rebellion was an attempt by the military to win a 
stronger position in the political arena, but this attempt failed. The aftermath saw the 
military subordinated to the political will of the royal family.45  The royal family acts as a 
party because the monarch must form alliances to support his decisions.  Ibn Saud formed 
these alliances through patronage and marriage, but this institution has evolved.  The 
check the ulama provides to the monarch resembles a judicial branch because they 
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provide a coherent link to the Koran, their founding document of law. These institutions 
are not democratic, but they are stable institutions which resemble democratic 
institutions.   
D. KING SAUD’S ABDICATION 
The institutional relationships formed during the reign of Ibn Saud were evident 
during the abdication of King Saud, the first monarch after Ibn Saud.  The problems arose 
early in King Saud’s reign.  They were a combination of financial difficulties, internal 
resistance movements, external threats, and his attempt to consolidate power for his 
progeny.46  The process, which limited the power of the king and then forced him to 
abdicate, was led by a rival family alliance that ultimately determined the fate of the 
kingdom. 
Three divisions crystallized during the struggle.  The two main sections divided 
themselves between King Saud and Crown Prince Faysal.  King Saud’s alliance was 
composed of his sons, whom he strategically placed in the government.  The Faysal 
alliance was composed of his half brothers, including the Sudayri Seven and several 
brothers of Abd al-Rahman, the non-ruling branch of the al-Saud.  A third radical group 
was composed of younger princes led by Talal which had liberal reformist ideas for the 
kingdom.47  They were a very weak group because of their age and the improbability of 
their actually becoming rulers.  They also had very radical ideas relative to the 
conservative monarchy.  The source of their political power came from their willingness 
to change allegiance.  Their dubious loyalties forced the leading factions to patronize 
them for their support or neutralize their influence. 
The patronage for their support was evident “in the early 1960s, [when] rumors 
were spread that the king wanted to introduce a nominated parliament and to implement 
certain reforms in the Saudi political system.”48  This parliament was not pursued beyond 
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the rumor, but the Talal-led group saw this as a positive sign of reform and aligned with 
King Saud.  Faysal tried to neutralize a populace backing which supported reform by 
lifting strict controls over the newspapers, which had been instituted under Ibn Saud.49  
The final theoretical divisions were described as a liberal government versus the 
conservative status quo.  King Saud had no intentions of pursuing the liberal policies, but 
this move garnered him populace support that was crucial in staving-off the coup attempt.  
The move revealed an underlying sentiment in 1960 Saudi society toward liberal policies.  
This sentiment was fueled by the greater movements in the Arab region of figures such as 
Gamal Nasser and events in Iraq. 
The reign of Saud ended in 1964.  The process that led to his demise was a 
general consensus of the royal family, the exile of Talal, which ended the reformist led 
faction, and the agreement of the religious and tribal factions solicited by the Faysal 
faction to gain broader acceptance of the family’s decision.50  When Faysal took control 
he advocated a ten point plan for development that advocated “the drafting of a basic law 
and a judicial council.”51  These two reforms were the most liberal policies stated by the 
monarchy, but King Faysal did not progress toward either.  The call for liberal policies in 
the kingdom was evident in newspapers after Faysal lifted censorship, but it is unclear of 
the links between the views in the paper and the general population.  Liberal dissension 
was most likely a scholarly debate rather than a general desire due to the intricate 
patronage system established by the al-Saud family which gave most tribal and religious 
leaders a stake in the success of an al-Saud-run government. 
The first liberal views within the family were represented by prince Talal, who, 
when exiled from the country, continued his political activity by promoting the 
framework for a constitutional monarchy that advocated the continued rule of the al-Saud 
family, supplemented by a formal council partially appointed by the king and partially 
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elected by the populace.52  This impetus was rooted in the growing liberal political 
movements in the region and external Western views inspired by the foreign education of 
the elite returning to the kingdom.  Once again, the royal family acted like a political 
party building alliances and spawning a conservative/liberal debate.  The debate was won 
by the conservative branch of the family, but the liberal branch was evident in the 
younger progeny of the al-Saud. 
E. THE 1992 EDICT 
The successions of King Khalid and Fahd were smoother than that of Saud to 
Faysal, but the future difficulty in succession stemmed from one source: the generational 
question.  When would the next generation take control?  The royal family institution was 
a fragile alliance structure that centered on the sons of Ibn Saud, but a generational shift 
would radically change the alliance structure because numerous next generation princes 
would have equal legitimacy claims.  They would also have to fight against younger sons 
of Ibn Saud for the throne.  King Fahd was the first to present a royal decree that 
attempted to settle the problem.  The 1992 Basic Law and subsequent decrees from King 
Abdullah further defined the process of succession and created other governmental 
branches to formally share power with the king. 
 The 1992 Edict was a revolutionary concept, but by no means was it the first 
attempt at liberal change.  King Saud used a liberal platform to garner support from the 
masses when his reign was in jeopardy.  Once Faysal took power he had a ten point plan 
that advocated several liberal views that failed to materialize.  Ibn Saud had stated that he 
favored mass participation in the newly conquered Hijaz and Khalid kept promising 
liberal reforms, but neither delivered.53  The common link was liberal promises were 
made to gain political stability, but once the stability was achieved, the monarch went 
back to consolidating, not sharing, power. 
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The 1992 edict did three things: (1) it created basic laws for Saudi Arabian 
citizens, (2) it redefined the succession process, and (3) it created a larger council of 
advisors.  Each of these issues affected the monarchy in profound ways by redefining his 
relationship with the people and the royal family.54  Each item shared more power, but 
did not limit the absolute authority of the monarch.  The looming question was would 
these changes become institutionalized or were they fleeting promises that would be 
eliminated when an ultra conservative monarch took control?  
The succession process was changed to address the generational succession 
problem facing the royal family by expanding the possible claimants to the thrown.  It 
stated that “the most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to the Holy 
Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet.”55  This statement opens the Kingship to every 
male member of the family at the discretion of the king.  At first glance this step seemed 
like an attempt to change the succession from his brother to his sons, but when he 
allowed Abdullah to remain Crown Prince this reason was discredited.  The alternative 
reason was that he saw the danger in disunity of the family if the next generation did not 
have a legitimate way to enter the succession process.56 
King Abdullah took further steps to codify the line of succession.  “Future crown 
princes will have to be approved by an ‘allegiance commission’ made up of Ibn Saud's 
sons, the eldest sons of the brothers who have died since Ibn Saud's death, as well as the 
sons of the current king and crown prince.”57  The allegiance council works as an 
approval entity that acts to serve the interest of the royal family.  Before the allegiance 
council, the King named the crown prince without a formal system to oppose the 
decision.  The king did ensure the family supported the decision of succession that 
                                                 
54 Rashed Aba-Namay, “The New Saudi Representative Assembly,” Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 5, 
No. 2 (1998): 235-265, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3399342 (accessed February 10, 2008).        
55 “The New Constitution: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol.8, No. 3 (1993), 
258-270, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3381589 (accessed February 10, 2008). 
56 Rashed Aba-Namay, “The New Saudi Representative Assembly,” Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 5, 
No. 2 (1998): 235-265, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3399342 (accessed February 10, 2008). 
57 Simon Henderson, “New Saudi Rules on Succession: Will They Fix the Problem,” The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, (October 25, 2006). 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2526 (accessed October 19, 2008). 
 26
usually took into account seniority, prestige in the family, uprightness as a Muslim (or at 
least the image of uprightness), tradition, and ability to govern. 
The modern succession usually went along the line of the eldest sons of Ibn Saud, 
but some were passed over.58  The crown prince would usually have a family alliance 
that ensured his succession, and this family backing ensured a balance of power between 
the King and the Crown Prince.  Now, the balance of power between the family and the 
King was codified in the allegiance council because the family formally weighs in on the 
decision.  The formality in the system was new, but the informal process was more or less 
the same.  It was crucial that the process was formalized because the generational change 
of power was looming.  The allegiance council transforms the participation by the royal 
family in the political process.  The royal family is evolving from a monarchical system 
to one that displays the characteristics of a single party system.  The allegiance council 
codifies this change. 
The Majlis al-Shura was the biggest step in changing the form of the Saudi 
government.  The majlis was an institution in Arabian tradition.  The leader of a tribe 
would have individuals come to his tent and they would discuss matters that pertained to 
governance and culture in their society.  The majlis was used by Abd al-Aziz to show his 
acumen in governing and to display the abundance of his conquest and grandeur of his 
rule.  The majlis was a forum to request favor from the king, but it was also a platform 
for the king to reveal policy and solve problems in the kingdom.  In its own right, the 
forum gave the king legitimacy because others saw that other power brokers in the 
community came to seek patronage and show support for Ibn Saud.  The Majlis al-Shura 
was an extension of this tradition, but it expands the rudimentary role of executing 
policies to govern.59  The 1992 Edict created a Majlis al-Shura by appointment to debate 
policies in the realm and produce advice for the king.  The Majlis, in this light, was only 
an echo of the king’s power because he appointed the members of the system and could 
abolish it at his discretion.  The king also did not have to take advice from the Majlis. 
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King Abdullah expanded the legislative powers of the Majlis in October of 2003, 
but still did not allow elected seats, although many reform elements called for elections.  
The dilemma with the Majlis al-Shura is two fold.  First, a legislative branch of any kind 
comes under attack from a religious perspective because the Koran is considered the only 
legitimate source of laws that govern a Muslim society and legislation is not needed to 
interpret the will of god.  In this respect, religious scholars are against institutional 
developments that challenge the Koran’s governing credibility.60  Their view is that the 
Koran is a stand-alone embodiment of the law that governs from an omniscient 
perspective and any legislative branch of government smacks of secular intrusion in 
defining the law, a role the men of religion have played for 1400 years. 
Second, a legislative body has always served as a direct challenge to absolute 
control by a monarch.  A monarchy is a centralized method of governing by means of 
suppressing challenges to legitimacy and competency of the crown.  The Majlis al-Shura 
does not infringe on the power of the monarch because it acts purely as an advisory body.  
In this respect it does not threaten the rule of the king; it only enhances his ability to be 
an effective ruler.  Any expansion of a legislative body would continue to erode the 
power of the monarch, which is why King Abdullah and the royal family are 
apprehensive about allowing the election of a portion of the Majlis.  As long as it is 
viewed as an advisory board (as stated in the 1992 Edict), it does not challenge 
legitimacy or competency.  If the elections were allowed, as the reformists desire, the 
advisory role would still exist, but there would be greater pressure to follow the advice.  
As long as the members are appointed, the power of the position comes from the king and 
does not diminish his sovereignty in any way.  If the member is elected, the power comes 
from the people and his advice cannot be discarded without some consequence to public 
opinion. 
F. ASSESSMENT 
The Majlis al-Shura and the Allegiance Commission are signs of democratic 
evolution because they are institutions created by the monarchy which codify a process to 
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solve challenges to the crown.  Successful successions have occurred because of the 
successor’s strong alliances and elements of society having a stake in the success of the 
power change.  The institutions represent an acknowledgement of the evolving process, 
and an attempt to formalize the alliance process within the royal family with the 
Allegiance Commission, and increase the stakes of Saudi society in the government by 
having an advisory council that seeks to co-opt greater swaths of society.  The next 
logical step, if there is an evolution toward democracy, would be to expand the allegiance 
council from the royal family to the Saudi citizens and to extend elections to the Majlis 
al-Shura, but these institutions are untried.  The creation and success of these institutions 
thus far has been examined from the view of the ruling power brokers in the society, but 
examining the elements which forced these changes may serve to better understand if the 
changes are attempts to quell the masses for a while and then renege, or if the changes are 
lasting institutions that are the first steps of many that are taking place to evolve the Saudi 
Arabia to a more liberal society. 
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III. POLITICAL GROUPS EVOLVING IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 The relationship between the sovereign and the population has slowly evolved 
from viewing the population as subjects, to fostering citizenry.  The resistance to the 
evolving relationship endures because the religious beliefs of the society perpetuate the 
antiquated relationship.  The religious element perpetuated the “subject” mentality by 
teaching the population that the al-Saud were the rightful rulers,61 and the tradition of 
baya,62 or oath to the leader.  Both of these relationships were codified in The Basic Law 
of Rule.  Article 6 states that: 
The Citizen shall acknowledge the rule of the King according to the Book 
of God and the Sunna of his apostle, and to yield and obey him in time of 
scarcity and of abundance, as well as in times of unpleasantness and 
good.63 
The relationship was reinforced by the royal family supplying the trappings of 
government.  The tangibles they provided were security, economic growth, and social 
services.  The intangibles were upward mobility, prestige in a high position for allies to 
the family, and the opportunity to pursue an austere Sunni Muslim life.  In return, the 
King wanted oil revenues, loyalty, and a subject that submitted to al-Saud rule.  The 
inevitable friction emerged when segments of society felt left out of the intangibles, and 
desired new liberties that their government did not provide. 
A. THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT 
 The most powerful group in Saudi Arabia, absent the royal family, is the religious 
establishment.  The religious “clergy” in Muslim society is the ulama, but the early Saudi 
strain of the ulama lacked the doctrinal expertise and educational prowess of religious 
leaders in other, more established areas.  This deficiency was due to the Nadj lacking a 
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center of religious learning.64  The early practitioners of religious clergy functions were 
called mutawwaa.  The relationship of religion to the state reaches back to Saud1744 and 
was instrumental in building the modern day Saudi Arabian state.  Many of the Bedouin 
traditions spawned a deep tribal system that presented a strong resistance to central 
control, but the mutawwaa were able to sedentarize some 150,000 tribesman by 1930 and 
disciplined them in the ways of Wahhabi teachings.  This made them less dependant on 
nomadic ways and more dependent on state control to thrive.65  By 1980, only 5% of 
Saudi Arabia “remained wholly nomadic.”66  The Bedouin value system remained in 
Saudi culture, but the nomadic lifestyle perished.67  The abolition of the nomadic way of 
life was a necessary step in state-building in Saudi Arabia and the mutawwaa role in 
recruiting tribesman into a sedentary life style was crucial to this task. 
 The mutawwaa, which institutionalized to form the legitimate ulama in Saudi 
Arabia, also contributed to Ibn Saud’s domination by providing the doctrine to support 
his legitimacy.68  Ibn Saud grasped the advantages of ulama and used them to promote 
political decisions and to deal with resistance movements.  In 1927 the ulama fatwa, a 
religious decree that undermined the ikhwan position to rebel against Ibn Saud, gave the 
ulama the authority to sanction politics in the kingdom.69 They also sanctioned the 
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supported the 1979 retaking of the mosque in Mecca from religious extremists.71  In these 
roles, the ulama gave their approval, which has made it necessary for all Kings to seek 
their advice in such matters. 
 As the Saudi Kingdom grew from the Nadj, other religious groups were 
incorporated into the kingdom.  The Nadj was isolated from the culturally diverse coastal 
regions and the strain of religion was characteristic of the isolation.  The Wahhabi 
teachings were absent the six centuries of scholarly itjihad (religious discourse).  The 
stringent teachings made its followers intolerant of other Islamic sects, which caused 
conflict as the kingdom spread beyond the Najd.  Hasa, the Hijaz, and Asir practiced 
more liberal forms of Islam.  Once Ibn Saud conquered these regions, the mutawwaa 
moved in and exerted strict religious adherence to expand the dominance of Wahhabi 
teachings to all areas of the new Ibn Saud kingdom.  The religious organization was the 
original foundation of the House of Saud, but a rift has developed between the religious 
establishment and the royal family, and within the religious establishment itself. 
The mutawwaa have a long history of strict enforcement in regions outside the 
Nadj. This exacerbated the hostilities between the “state religion” and other sects: 
They [mutawwaa] terrorized people under the guise of enforcing the 
sharia, Islamizing Arabia and reforming religious practices.  Their worst 
atrocities were committed in Hasa against the Shi’a population in 1913 
and the Hijazi resort of Ta’if in 1924.72 
When Ibn Saud marched into Hijaz, the Wahhabi ulama followed and destroyed age old 
Muslim shrines.  The Ismaili sect in Asir faced the same treatment.  The ruthless tactics 
of the mutawwaa, aided by the ikhwan, were successful in gaining dominance for the 
Wahhabi interpretation of Islam throughout Saudi Arabia, but several cleavages still 
exist. 
The historical support of the Wahhabi clerics for the House of Saud, and their 
hostile relations with the other religious sects in the Kingdom, creates a dilemma that 
kings have dealt with in various ways.  The actions taken to resolve this dilemma have 
separated the religious organization into three political entities.  The first was the ulama 
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that were co-opted into the political system.  This group has the most political power.  
The reason they were co-opted was because the kingdom needed them to acquiesce to 
advance progressive building policies to propel Saudi Arabia into the modern era.  The 
modernity driven policies were in conflict with austere religious doctrine.  The immense 
prosperity due to oil revenues also spawned a lavish life style for the builders of Saudi 
society.  To continue policies that promoted modernity, the House of Saud needed to 
incorporate the religious ulama into the process. 
This was accomplished using three methods.  First, the ulama became an official 
part of the government.  The Committee for the Protection of Virtue and Prevention of 
Vice was created under Ibn Saud.  The mutawwaa were recruited for the purpose of 
policing the morals of society.  They physically punished citizens that did not meet their 
standards of appearance and imprisoned those that they accused of more serious 
infractions.73  They evolved into an organization “which enforced Wahhabi fatwas and 
punished those who did not fulfill their religious obligations.”74  They acted, for the most 
part, independent of government influence, but the King has restricted their actions as 
needed.  Further institutionalization of the ulama occurred in later years.  The Grand 
Mufti became the head of the religious establishment and presided over the Board of 
Senior Ulama (BSU) and The Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal 
Opinion (CRLO).  The BSU “issues fatwas on major public issues . . . was established in 
1971 and provide the ultimate decrees on sharia.”  The CRLO “conducted research and 
administered private ifta, religious guidance.”  These offices contained the most powerful 
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These institutions include the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Instructions, and 
Teaching which “propagates Islam and religious guidance,” local mosque, and judiciary 
and legal appointments.75 
Second, they allowed the ulama to influence the educational system.  King Faisal 
upset the ulama on issues centered on modernity.  The term modernity was equivalent to 
“Westernized” and one of the big issues was schools for girls.  Faisal simply said that if 
you do not want schools for girls, do not send your girls, and if your town did not want 
one, they would not have one.  Faisal allowed the ulama to control the curriculum in the 
schools in return for their backing of modernity policies.76  Lastly, Saudi Arabia became 
the proliferators of Wahhabi doctrine around the world by funding charitable projects and 
building Mosques in foreign countries through the Moslem World League. 77     
This group of the ulama is usually older and aligned with the royal family, but 
King Abdullah battles with “dogmatic admonitions of the entrenched Wahhabis”78 to 
further reform efforts.  Because this relationship was literally as old as the kingdom, this 
portion of the ulama sees their fate tied to that of the royal family.  The ulama by no 
means do everything the royal family desires, but they do what is necessary to promote 
their own survival.  This group is most likely motivated to support the royal family in the 
face of any progressive political reforms at all cost.  Because their survival is so closely 
linked to the survival of the royal family, and the idea of a progressive government is in 
contradiction to their religious teachings, they are firmly against liberal reform. 
The second group of the ulama is generally younger and not as involved in the 
formal ulama that have been co-opted by the royal family.  They view the co-option of 
religious leaders as a “corruption” of Islamic teachings and pushed for a shift in power 
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from the royal family to a religiously appointed council.  Their criticisms were addressed 
in two petitions to King Fahd in 1991 and 1992.  The first called for the creation of an 
independent Consultative Council appointed by the clergy with legislative powers, and 
the second elaborated on their demands, leveling sharp criticisms of government 
inefficiency. 79 
Their philosophies are influenced by the extremist political movements in the 
region and they view the established ulama as advocating religious doctrine to support 
the crown, rather than adhering to the Koran.  Their views are not aligned with that of the 
royal family so they are restricted from participating in the government.  Therefore, their 
numbers are lower and they generally have less financial backing and thus fewer 
followers.  The most extreme of this group see the royal family as illegitimate and believe 
that they should promote jihad against them.  Their recommendations to the King reveal a 
limit to his power by an ulama appointed legislative body, but they do not go as far as 
liberal rights bestowed on the masses. 
The third group is non-Sunni groups that have been oppressed by the Sunni 
establishment.  In general, their religious views are more tolerant to outside ideas.  These 
groups consist of the Shia in the Eastern province, the Hanafi schools in the Hijaz, the 
Ishmali in Asir, and non-Muslim Christians and Jews.  They are treated as second class 
citizens in some cases and are victims of a repressive system.  The royal family does not 
provide adequate protection for these groups, but they do restrain the main stream ulama 
to reduce unrest and promote economic prosperity. 
The Shi’a is the largest religious dissident group in Saudi Arabia. In the Eastern 
Province, the Shia population is roughly half a million.80   The Wahhabi have sought to 
deny them high ranking positions in the military and the government.  Human Rights 
Watch conducted a study in 2008 which revealed a systematic oppressive system against 
Shia all over the country and cited specific violations of human rights ranging from 
                                                 
79 Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia (New York:  Palgrave, 2001), 108. 
80 Ibid., 97. 
 35
denying marriage between a Sunni man and Shia woman,81 to denying property to Shia 
via a fatwa on the basis that it would support “their corrupt religion and evil creed.”82  
Shia have gone on strike to battle religious intolerance and poor economic treatment in 
1953, 1956, 1970, and 1979.83  King Abdullah promoted a series of public meetings 
called “National Dialogue” which brought together opposing views in Saudi Arabia in 
2005.84 The Wahhabi establishment did not legitimize the meetings, which did not 
solidify the reform hoped for by the Shia and minority religious groups.85 
The dominance of the Wahhabi ulama co-opted into the Saudi government does 
not bode well for liberal change in Saudi Arabia.  King Abdullah was labeled a reform 
minded king, but his greatest challenge to reform is the ulama.  The minority religious 
groups will be less opposed to liberal reforms because they represent a moderate political 
view which is open to democratic ideas.  The Shia are susceptible to liberal reform 
because they are largely influenced by Iran and Grand Ayatolla Sustani in Iraq.  These 
governments are Shia run and are more liberal.86  The theocratic republic in Iran, and the 
emerging democracy in Iraq, gives the Shia in Saudi Arabia a model for political 
participation that could end the oppressive practices of the Saudi religious establishment. 
B. THE ROLE OF WOMEN 
The role of women in Saudi society is overwhelmingly defined by Islam.  The life 
of a woman can be described as one left waiting: 
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A woman waits to be married; then she waits for the next time she will 
have a sexual union with her husband; then she waits for her next child to 
be born; and finally she waits for old age, when relieved of her 
childbearing duties, she assumes a place of honor within her family.87 
 
A woman in the lower class was not affected much by the vast changes in Saudi society.  
The largest changes to her life were the increased services enjoyed by all Saudi citizens, 
such as improved health care.  Women of wealthy families are preoccupied with trips 
outside the country on shopping sprees to Europe, or remaining in Saudi Arabia to do the 
same, but their purposes were, ironically, the same as lower class women, even though 
their education level is generally higher than that of men, and they normally speak 
several languages.88  Women in the middle class were the group most affected by the 
changes in Saudi Arabia.  They entered the professional world and were often highly 
educated relative to their male counterparts.  This group displayed a rebellious 
undercurrent that took shape in several movements. 
 A protest against a gender-based driving ban occurred in 1990 during the time 
period when American soldiers were stationed in the Kingdom.  The impetus for the 
event was largely due to the American women soldiers and their visible independence.  
“47 women met at a car park. Fifteen of them – those with international driving licenses – 
dismissed their drivers and got behind the wheel as the other women piled into the 
cars.”89  The car protest was followed up 18 years later with a video protest broadcast on 
the web.90  The protest did not have many participants and was dealt with quickly and 
severely, but it was evidence that women do want more rights and will risk moderate 
protest to get them. 
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 Amnesty International published a report on the state of women’s rights in Saudi 
Arabia in 2006 and found that reform efforts were taking place.  King Abdullah proposed 
judicial changes to codify rights for women, and the Grand Mufti issued statement 
banning the practice of forcing women to marry.  The municipal elections of 2005 were a 
disappointment because women did not vote, but activists petitioned the King to appoint 
women in local municipal positions.91  Saudi women’s rights activist Wajiha al- 
Huweidar expressed the concerns of Saudi women that desired liberal reforms:  “When a 
woman begins to become liberated, she is not respected by society . . . [the state] shows 
no respect for a woman who speaks freely.  She pays the price on every level; her family, 
religion, and society.” 
 Women have gained more education and more jobs and Islamic law gives them 
the right to an equal portion of their husband’s estates, but this has not transferred to 
political rights.  Officials interviewed in Saudi Arabia in 2008 indicate that women will 
participate in the 2009 elections.92  Women are favorable to democratic change because 
they see it as a way to gain basic rights, such as to drive.  Protection from violent crimes, 
and laws that lift restrictions in the workplace, are also on the activists’ agenda.  The 
political backing to accomplish this is small, but they have wealth as a group from 
inheritance93 and are gaining more in education than their male counterparts, which is a 
recipe for greater participation in the government. 
C. TRIBES 
 The most significant political power of the tribes was the continued participation 
in the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG).  The force from a 1992 estimate was 
roughly 75,000 troops, of which 20,000 were in a reserve status.  Their purpose was to 
protect the royal family, but they were more than just a security force, as evidenced in 
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their participation in the Persian Gulf War.94  The SANG was a direct descendent of the 
ikhwan, but they have been modernized and trained to meet present internal and external 
challenges.  The SANG was a remnant of the tribal element in Saudi Arabia that 
survived. 
Other tribal links have been diluted due because of population migration in urban 
areas. The tribe played a major role in the fledgling Saudi state because it provided 
protection and security for the individual.  In a pre-modern era these services were crucial 
to surviving in the harsh desert environment because resources were scarce.  The basic 
building-block of the tribe was the family.  The tribe was a way to promote the well-
being of the family.  As the state grew and sedentarized ever increasing portions of the 
tribe, the state evolved into the protector and the deliverer of well-being the family.95  
The family unit as the building-block remained the same, but the state was the new patron 
to which greater swaths of Saudi society linked their fortunes.  The SANG holds a 
prestigious position in Saudi society and a member of the royal family serves as the head, 
but it is merely a position that garners support for the head.  The military body plays no 
significant political role. 
D. TECHNOCRATS 
 Technocrats are a small portion of Saudi society.  They are characterized by 
having higher education from Western schools, participation in the Saudi bureaucracy, 
and some type of financial backing from a wealthy family or from the Saudi government 
in the form of grants.  The rise of the technocratic class of Saudi citizens is directly 
related to the oil boom and the increased educational funding in Saudi Arabia.  Before the 
secular educational system was created in Saudi Arabia, the ulama played a large part in 
educating the population.  After the consolidation of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud faced a 
population that was 95% illiterate.  In the late 1940s, the oil revenues spawned two 
avenues of education to Saudis.  One path sent Saudis to Egypt to be educated.  The other 
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was backed by ARAMCO, which selected employees to be educated in the American 
University in Beirut and other American Universities. 
The next step in education occurred under King Saud when he created the 
ministry of education in 1953.  Under the new ministry, with help from then Crown 
Prince Faysal, education was expanded to include women and a national strategy was 
attempted to educate the Saudi population.  The religious conservatives had a strong hand 
in the embryonic educational system, which was characterized by as much as one third of 
the curriculum devoted to religious teachings.  The break from religious teachings 
occurred on the higher education levels with the establishment of state schools in 1953 
and 1954 bearing the names of King Abd Aziz and King Faysal.  During this period, 
students began to study abroad.  There were 20,000 in Saudi run universities, whereas 
5,000 were in universities outside the country.96  The 1980s would see these numbers rise 
to about 18,000 studying in the US alone, and 100,000 in Saudi Universities producing 
20,000 graduates annually combined.97 
 The influence of technocrats in high levels of the government began in the 
cabinet.  The 14 member cabinet was formed in the waning years of Abdul Aziz, but the 
members were high princes and members of the ulama.  These ministers formed the 
skeletal structure of what evolved into a government cabinet. In 1975 the number of 
positions on the Council of Ministers was increased from fourteen to twenty.   Eight of 
the positions were filled by princes and two by Islamic leaders. The rest were filled by 
the Western-educated technocrats. 98 
Once the students from abroad returned to the country they were given favored 
positions over the domestic graduates in government and Universities.  This created 
animosity with two groups.  One was the domestic graduates.  They often reached a 
ceiling in the government and education ministries, unless the institution was controlled 
by the ulama.  The second group was the ulama because they were battling for control of 
                                                 
96 Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia:  Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis (London:  Routledge 
1993) 15-21. 
97 Ibid., 21. 
98 Sandra Mackey, The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom (New York:  W.W. Norton and Company, 
2002), 209. 
 40
the educational system.  The ulama was opposed to the progressive educational view of 
King Faysal, but once he gave them control of the system, they used it to spread their 
form of Islam and promote the austere living they advocated.  Once the technocrats 
started gaining control in higher learning facilities the ulama felt threatened because they 
believed Westernization would occur in their conservative institutions. 
The higher positions the technocrats gained in the bureaucracy enabled them to 
wield an increased political voice in the government.  Saudi Arabia was run by the clerics 
and the royal family for many years.  This created a knowledge gap between those that 
ran the government and the general population.  It is true that the royal family suppressed 
general participation in the government, but they could not participate even if they 
wanted to because they did not have any formal training in governmental affairs.  The 
training abroad changed this dynamic and the increased exposure to Western governance 
and society facilitated a natural progressive infusion into the bloated and ineffective 
bureaucracy.  This group, by far, had been the strongest supporters of reform in the Saudi 
government from the inside, where they have been able to stake a spot in the political 
infrastructure. 
E. EXPATRIATES 
 The expatriate, or foreigner, population had a significant role in building Saudi 
Arabia from a fledgling state.  Their expertise has propelled Saudi Arabia into the 21st 
century.  The expatriates are economically and ethnically diverse and are tightly 
controlled in the kingdom.99  They range from prestigious ARAMCO employees 
providing the know how to extract the lifeblood of the country, to domestic servants that 
do cleaning and chauffer Saudi citizens around the country.  Saudi citizens have an 
adverse attitude to manual labor, which creates many opportunities for foreign labor.  
There is also an unspoken hierarchy that dictating the treatment of expatriates.  They do 
not share many of the rights Saudi citizens have, but they remain in the country under 
these harsh conditions for purely economic reasons. 
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 Expatriates are too diverse to vie for political power in the country, but they make 
up from 30-40% of the total population.100  Their sheer numbers activate their political 
power when something is done by the kingdom that adversely affects the entire group, 
but it also makes them a constant internal security threat.  King Fahd tried to institute a 
tax on the expatriate population in 1988, but expatriates threatened to leave the country, 
which caused a rapid repeal of the law.101  The expatriate population was not only large, 
but it was growing at about 7% from 1975-1980.  “In 1980 there was one foreign worker 
for every adult Saudi.”102 The third development plan tried to reduce the growth rate to 
1.2% to reduce the percentage of expatriates in the country as well as provide jobs to 
Saudi citizens, but this goal was not met.  The sixth development plan focused on a 
Saudization plan to reduce unemployment of Saudi nationals, but Saudi citizens resisted 
the plan because the type of labor offered did not have the prestige or wages desired.  
Entrepreneurs did not like the plan because Saudi citizens wanted too much money. 
In the end, expatriates are needed to keep the Saudi economy producing, but the 
growth of job markets in other locations in the region may lure workers to a better 
working environment.  The continued criticisms by international groups of poor human 
rights for expatriates may also provide a push for more rights.  The contribution of skills 
that build the kingdom and make life easier for Saudi citizens is the only commodity the 
expatriates bring.  The demand for their labor will not diminish in the foreseeable future, 
which might eventually lead to greater human rights, but it is unlikely that expatriates 
will ever wield political power without some external element forcing a change.  
F. MERCHANTS 
The merchant class was catered to during the rise of the al-Saud family.  The 
farther the kingdom expanded from the Nadj, the more prevalent the merchant class was 
in the economy.  The predominance of the merchant class in the Hijaz and Hasa was due 
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to their proximity to the coast.  These regions were far more integrated in trade outside 
the region and gave rise to a politically powerful merchant class.  The merchant class was 
important because they were dutiful tax payers and generally had a more cosmopolitan 
perspective.  They were also predominately indigenous whereas regions that experienced 
colonization or came under an empire’s rule developed a foreign merchant class. 
The merchant class grew in economic power during the oil boom years because 
the government collected oil revenues and redistributed it to the merchant class by land 
distribution and real estate speculation, promotion of extensive agriculture, government 
procurement, and government support to industry.103  The wealthiest of the merchants 
number about 500,000.104  “The Olayans, Mahfouzes, bin Ladens, Kamels, Ali Rezas, 
Zamils, Ghoseibis and Jamils imported food, cars and construction equipment and built 
highways, housing for workers and whole towns, dozens of schools, hospitals and, 
naturally, palaces and chichi army barracks.  Now they provide services which keep the 
country going.”105  Saudi Arabia had 14 banks in the late 1970s, but these banks were 
taken over by Saudi citizens.  They kept Western managers and conducted business as 
Western banks.  They had a tremendous advantage over the indigenous banks because 
they operated with “interest” policies whereas Saudi banks did not have interest policies 
because it was against the Koran.106 
The merchant class can be categorized as the bourgeoisie and have expanded their 
control from mere seekers of patronage from the Saudi family, to independent players in 
the global economy.  Their diversification in foreign assets has weaned them from a 
rentier role and made them employment providers and economic engines in the Saudi 
economy.  The government now relies on them to provide good paying jobs to the 
population, which allows the government to reduce expenditures in the bureaucracy. 
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The actual merchant class perspective of the royal family is dubious.  Some 
merchants have accrued wealth and have the ability to travel to foreign countries to live 
as they wish.  Their freedom to find happiness outside the country makes them oblivious 
to the social situation in the country.  Those that have considerable interest in the country 
have a different perspective on the society.  Policies such as Saudization, which hurt their 
profits by forcing them to hire workers that demand higher wages and provide less 
quality labor forces the merchants to seek greater political power to dictate prudent 
economic policy.  Second, their rentier dependence has faded, which means they are free 
to invest and build industries in other countries.  This means that if conditions are not 
favorable in Saudi Arabia to support their business interests, they can move them to 
neighboring countries.  This capital flight could become a concern to the King as larger 
numbers of Saudi nationals become unemployed because of this.  The Saudi policy will 
either become more business friendly or the government will give entrepreneurs a greater 
say in government policy, which will lead to liberal political changes. 
The merchants are satisfied with their wealth, but their views are not uniform on 
democratic reform.  They do favor economic reform to open trade, promote privatization 
and less government manipulation of the market place.107  The merchants also fear the 
intrusion of the royal family in the economic market because there is an unfair advantage 
in the system which favors Saudi princes.  They fear “their influence to monopolize trade 
and relegate others to a secondary position.”108 
G. ASSESSMENT 
The political structure in Saudi Arabia is evolving.  The ulama were the most 
powerful political group in the country with the exception of the royal family, but the 
group was never monolithic in its views.  The co-opted ulama were Wahhabi Sunni 
clerics that posed little opposition to the conservative policies of the royal family.  They 
have allowed the royal family to conduct progressive policies as long as they are allowed 
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to control the social and moral fabric of society through the educational system, state run 
mosques, and their judicial duties.  They also approve of the proliferation of Islam around 
the world through charitable organizations funded by the Kingdom.  This gives them 
clout in the Islamic world and a foundation to affect politics around the globe.  The co-
opted ulama were the most powerful religious group in the Kingdom, but they compete 
with the other religious sects. 
 The more extreme Sunni clerics are ultra conservatives compared to the co-opted 
ulama.  They believe that the royal family’s power should be limited by a Majlis al-Shura 
appointed by the clergy, which is more liberal than having sole monarchical rule, but falls 
short of democratic elections for such a legislative council.  They do not support the 
liberal policies of the government and believe the most influential political religious 
clergy are nothing more than a rubber stamp on the royal regime.  They believe that the 
ulama should be more independent and not just a rubber stamp on the regime’s policies.  
Opposition to the co-opted ulama is shared with non-Sunni and more liberal forms of 
Sunni worship.  These groups are geographically concentrated in specific areas and are 
oppressed by the religious establishment.  They are more open to outside ideas because 
their religious views are not as stringent as the other two groups.  For this reason, they 
welcome liberal changes to give them a stronger say in government, but they also do not 
want to be at the mercy of a conservative Sunni majority.  The Shia are emboldened by 
recent circumstances in Iraq and Iran and support government change that will resemble 
these types of government. 
 Women, merchants, and technocrats support liberal reforms and act as a conduit 
to international norms and liberal ideology.  Women challenge conservative norms by 
advocating better human rights policies.  These policies range from domestic violence to 
voting and employment issues.  Merchants challenge the conservative economic 
philosophies and promote Western-style financial institutions and liberal entrepreneur 
and trade policies.  Technocrats challenge the bureaucratic system and promote Western-
style governance.  They invade the government via education and public works and 
services.  Technocrats support reform and form the greatest challenge to the religious 
establishment in the educational system.  They fill the lower and mid-level positions in 
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government where the royal family, religious groups, and government patrons dominate. 
They will vie for control of the bureaucracy in the future as they are promoted to higher 
positions.  These three groups do not act together, but their behavior supports a consistent 
reform agenda that reflects international norms. 
 The tribes and expatriates have marginal political power.  The tribes played an 
important part in forming the kingdom, but lost power when they were sedentarized and 
as the population urbanized.  The expatriates did not play a significant political role, but 
provided much needed.  As the kingdom pursues further Saudization of the work force, 
the population will evolve from one dependent on the patronage of the royal family 
through bureaucratic jobs, to one dependent on the growth of the private sector.  The 
population will struggle to overcome the obstacle presented between educational training 
and private sector demand, which will spawn political interest in economic policies.  This 
political interest in economic policies will grow to other political policies.  The 
expatriates will serve as a buffer until Saudi Arabia is able to provide citizens with the 
needed training to meet the demands of the economy. 
The royal family promotes policies that balance the needs of the religious 
conservative establishment with the needs of the reform minded political groups while 
seeking to neutralize the more extreme elements of each.  Since the religious 
establishment was an institution that developed from the creation of the state, it wields 
much more political power due to its superior organization and vast and influential 
structure.  Liberal groups are in the developmental stages of organization.  As their 
organizations grow, they will become more effective at proposing, supporting, and 
instituting political platforms.  The political spectrum in Saudi Arabia will resemble a 
Western conservative right and liberal left framework that the royal family will struggle 
to appease.  The liberals must build up their institutions to compete with the 
conservatives.  The next chapter covers the internal and external pressures which favor 
institutional changes fueled by the demographic changes occurring in Saudi Arabia and 
the international community. 
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IV. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES FORCING 
LIBERALIZATION 
 In addition to the vertical changes happening in particular political groups in 
Saudi Arabia, there are also large changes happening across the country on a macroscopic 
level.  These changes are occurring rapidly and cleavages are widening the gap between 
the aristocratic form of governing and the general demographic changes of the 
population.  The pressures felt by the al-Saud are coming from internal and external 
sources.  The internal pressures are the rapidly growing population, increasing 
educational levels, growing internet and modern technology usage, and increasing 
criticism in the press. The external sources are the international political and economic 
world order, Islamic extremism, security concerns, and non-governmental organizations. 
A. POPULATION 
 The first internal pressure comes from the growth of the population.  The 
population growth is attributed to the oil boom period that started in the 1970s and ended 
in the early 80s.  At the end of Ibn Saud’s reign in 1953, Saudi Arabia was composed of 3 
million native inhabitants and an unknown numbers of foreigners.  The population grew 
to 5 million in the 70s, but it more than doubled by 1985 at the end of the oil boom, as 
shown by Figure 1.  From the beginning of the oil boom to 2000, the per capita GDP of 
Saudi Arabia decreased by 40%.109  The decrease was due to fluctuations in oil prices, 
but it was also eroded by population growth. 
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Figure 1.   Saudi Arabian Population Growth (1950-2005)110 
 
The population growth placed a large demand on the Saudi infrastructure.  These 
demands were combated by government spending as outlined in the Saudi 5 year plans 
starting in 1970.  These plans sought to meet the demands of a growing population by 
funding large infrastructure projects such as schools, public works, and investments in the 
country’s oil industry.  The country was being modernized, but labor was imported from 
outside the country.  The labor was needed in the 1970s to make up for the knowledge 
vacuum and to cater to the new found wealth that created a job market that Saudis viewed 
as beneath their stature.  Once the “baby boomers” of the oil boom came of age, they 
faced a job market that either did not provide a job they wanted or did not provide a job 
they were trained to do.  Unemployment became a problem, but Saudi Arabia did not 
have statistics that accurately portrayed the level of unemployment because the society 
absorbed the individual either in a family enterprise, charitable organization, or the 
governmental bureaucracy.  These tools managed the unemployment problem, but were 
inadequate as more Saudis entered the job market.  The first analysis of the 
unemployment data occurred in 2002 when the Saudi Central Department of Statistics 
calculated the levels for the first time.  In 1999 the Department of Man Power: 
Showed a native unemployment figure of 8.1%, with 6.8% for males and 
15.8% for women . . .  These data figures are extremely suspect, however, 
and assume that only 19% of the population, and 35.3% of the population 
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of working age, actually participates in the labor force.  This 19% 
compares with 33% in the rest of the Middle East, 41% in Latin America, 
45% in Europe, 50% in the United States, and 56% in east Asia . . . It 
implies that sheer lack of Saudi participation in labor force amounts to a 
socioeconomic disaster and is a far worse problem than unemployment.111 
The Saudi university dampened the initial unemployment numbers because they 
contained about 100,000 students for a number of years.  This was only a temporary 
band-aid, because once the students graduated, if they completed the university, they 
would still enter a job market that had fewer opportunities in the bureaucracy and did not 
fully accommodate the type of education provided by the Saudi educational system.  
Foreign educated individuals faired much better than patrons of the domestic system, 
which left a large fraction of educated Saudis on the side lines or accepting jobs beneath 
their educational level.  The 2000 GDP per capita shrank to $7,230,112 but this number 
would increase to $19,800113 in 2007 primarily fueled by the price of oil.  Although the 
number increased, the distribution of oil rents did not affect the unemployment rate 
significantly.   
Replacing of expatriates with Saudi nationals was the concentration of the 1985-
1995 development plans.  “Saudization policies introduced in the late 1990s are yet to be 
implemented in full, due to the resistance of Saudi employers and employees in absorbing 
the implications arising from the policies.”114  Saudi nationals demand greater wages and 
expect better working conditions than expatriates.  They also value prestige over pay and 
despise manual labor-intensive occupations.  A survey done in 1989 revealed that 80% of 
Saudis refused manual labor jobs.115  Figure 2 shows the distribution of Saudi nationals 
and foreign workers in the Saudi Arabian job market.  Defense and Public works and 
education are fields that are most preferred by nationals.  The largest fraction of the 
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foreign workers are in building, manufacturing, domestic services, and wholesale and 
retailing, which are undesirable because they require manual labor and lack prestige.  
These demands of the job market and nationals are not compatible. This does not bode 
well for the prospect of employing 100,000 Saudis entering the job market annually.116 
 The second challenge to the Saudi economic market is the educational system.  
Universities introduce 20,000 university graduates to the job market per year, but the 
training received does not meet the demands of the job market.  “Saudi Arabia 
emphasizes knowledge acquisition, rather than knowledge application.”117  Saudi Arabia 
has about 100,000 students in universities both foreign and domestic. Between 1995 and 
1999, 120,000 graduated.  Of these graduates, “only 8 percent studied technical subjects 
such as architecture or engineering. These students accounted for only 2 percent of the 
total number of Saudis entering the job market.118  Overwhelmingly, the degrees are 
obtained in humanities, which does not supply the required skill set the market demands.  
The king is aware of both the decoupled school system and the unemployment challenges 
faced by Saudi Arabia.  The efforts taken to combat this trend were announced in the 
sixth development plan, which was known as Saudization.  This method mandates 
employers with job forces of 20 to increase Saudi employment.119  This will employ 
more Saudis, which will help ease the unemployment burden, but there are questions 
from the business community about whether or not this will help the economy overall.120 
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Figure 2.   Occupational Distribution of Saudi and Non-Saudi Employees (1992) 121  
B. INTERNET 
The internet in Saudi Arabia is censored by the Internet Service Unit (ISU).  A 
study was done by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School 
that examined the type of internet sites the 2001 Council of Ministers Resolution blocked 
in Saudi Arabia.  The ISU stated the purpose of the resolution was to block web sites that 
were detrimental to Saudi Arabian culture.  The study concluded that not only were 
sexually explicit sites banned, but: 
the Saudi government maintains an active interest in filtering non-sexually 
explicit Web content for users within the Kingdom; (2) that substantial 
amounts of non-sexually explicit Web content is in fact effectively 
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inaccessible to most Saudi Arabians; and (3) that much of this content 
consists of sites that are popular elsewhere in the world.122 
While some sites are inconsistent with a religiously conservative society, such as 
those dealing with pornography and abortion, others, such as Amnesty International and 
Saudi.org are blocked because they reveal an unfavorable attitude toward the human 
rights record of Saudi Arabia.123 
Although these sites are blocked, many dissident blogs are created daily to discuss 
politics and current events in the Arab world.  The censorship efforts cannot expect to 
keep up with the growing number of users and internet sites in Saudi Arabia.  From 2000 
to 2007 internet usage in Saudi Arabia grew from 2% to 25%, which represents 5.74 
million new users.124  The growth of users represents a great desire to be connected with 
the world outside of Saudi Arabia, but also a need to connect with other Saudis.  Arabs 
can form virtual political organizations to create an Arab “global village.”  As the number 
of users and sites grow, the Saudi ISU will be as ineffective as liberal democracies in 
controlling information on the internet, which will serve as a peaceful realm for Saudis to 
vent about their government.  Extremist groups like al-Qaeda125 have used the internet to 
promote their causes and this avenue is certainly a prospect for extreme dissident 
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Howaider, a women’s right activist, protesting the driving ban,126 or the journalist Nadine 
al-Bedair, who has used the internet to display her views on equality for women are more 
prevalent.127 
The internet is a window to the outside world including international 
governmental organizations.  Amnesty International was one of the NGOs blocked.  The 
specific page blocked discussed the hostile environment in Saudi Arabia toward 
reformers.  This site was blocked in 2000 and was the only international NGO blocked at 
the time of this study, but it does not bode well for other such sites.  The NGOs give the 
average Saudi citizens that do not travel outside the country a point of reference 
independent of government regulation.  Although the sites are blocked, it is impossible to 
block the numerous internet blogs that reference the information.  The Saudi government 
harasses bloggers, but there are thousands of blog sites, and more produced daily.128 The 
NGOs will create pressure for the government to reveal practices in Saudi Arabia to the 
international community, as well as inform Saudi citizens of the international norms to 
promote internal reforms.  If all the NGO’s are able to be blocked, which is unlikely, the 
references to the NGOs from open media sources on the web will facilitate indirect 
pressure.  The cyber battle will be a model of peaceful evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary change. 
The religious authority in Saudi Arabia “issued an edict barring the use of cell 
phones with built-in cameras, blaming them for spreading obscenity.”129  This type of 
ban seems unseemly in Western countries, but the tight hold that the religious elite have 
on the society, and the threat they feel that comes from technology, are real.  The edict  
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was revoked due to its unpopularity,130 but the willingness of the state religious 
institution to maintain a conservative religious community, as well as their opposition to 
technology, is evident. 
C. MODERN TECHNOLOGY 
Under King Fahd, satellite TV usage was on the rise in the country.  The Saudis 
were exposed to ideas outside the control of the royals and they saw the shortcomings of 
their country when it came to human rights.131  It is estimated that 93.9% of Saudi 
Arabia’s households have Satellite TV.132  Programs that are broadcast in neighboring 
countries provide sources for a variety of entertainment that sparks controversy with the 
king because of its political nature, as well as with the religious conservatives because of 
its explicit nature and contradictions to their conservative values.  Oprah Winfrey’s show 
is an example of the penetration of popular Western culture.  Her appeal, as described by 
a Saudi woman, was attributed to her conservative dress and her plight as a woman.  “She 
struggles with her weight. She overcame depression. She rose from poverty and from 
abuse. On all these levels she appeals to a Saudi woman. People really idolize her 
here.”133 An average Saudi citizen explaining Oprah’s appeal is notable, but when 
Princess Reema bint Bandar al-Saud, daughter of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former 
Saudi ambassador to the United States, tells of Oprah’s life story, this underscores the 
penetration of Western culture.  The religious conservative’s resistance was captured in 
the statement espoused by a high ranking religious official in the government.  “There is 
no doubt that these programs are a great evil, and the owners of these channels are as 
                                                 
130 “Saudi Arabia Bans Sale of Dogs and Cats in Capital in Effort to Keep Sexes Apart,” Associated 
Press, July 31, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,395341,00.html (November 30, 2008). 
131 “House of Saud,” Frontline, DVD, directed by Jihan el-Tahri (Alexandria, VA: PBS Video, 2005). 
132 “While 93.9% of Saudi Arabia’s households have Satellite TV, some 48.4 % of households still 
tune into terrestrial TV,” Arab Advisors Group, January 28, 2007, 
http://www.arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-280107.htm (accessed November 29, 2008). 
133 Katherine Zoepf, “Saudi Women Find an Unlikely Role Model: Oprah,” The New York Times, 
September 18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/world/middleeast/19oprah.html (December 2, 
2008). 
 55
guilty as those who watch them.  It is legitimate to kill those who call for corruption if 
their evil can not be stopped by other penalties."134 
D. A FREE PRESS 
 A free press is a signature institution in developed democracies.  The institution is 
important because it provides a forum for the free discussion of politics, which serves to 
inform a citizen of the issues that affect their government.  “The press is the best 
instrument for enlightening the mind of man, and improving him as a rational, moral and 
social being.”135  Without a free press, facts can be manipulated or omitted by the 
government to hide irrational governing.   Saudi Arabia does not have a free press, but it 
also does not tell newspapers what to write.  Former editor of the London based al-Hayat 
explains that no one ever told him what to write, but what not to write.  “We [reporters] 
commit sins of omission, not commission.” 136 This type of censorship is self-censorship 
because the papers depend on revenue from advertisements.  If they print something that 
causes the Saudi government to ban the paper then they lose the revenue from the 
Kingdom.  The Basic Law provides general guidelines for the press in article 39: 
All the means of information, publications and expression shall abide by 
the good word and observe the laws of the State; they shall contribute to 
the education, and support the unity, of the nation; anything that leads to 
sedition, divisiveness or is prejudicial to the nation’s security and public 
relations, or is detrimental to human dignity and right are strictly 
prohibited.  Specific laws shall set down relevant provisions.137 
 
The guidelines for censorship are outlined in the Basic Law, but the mechanism to 
execute these policies was promulgated in the Press Law of 1964.  Control is strictly 
                                                 
134 “Saudi Judge Condemns ‘Immoral TV’,” BBC News, September 12, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7613575.stm (accessed November 30, 2008). 
135 Thomas Jefferson and John Foley, The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia (London England: Funk and 
Wagnalls Company, 1900), 718, http://books.google.com (accessed November 30, 2008). 
136 Jihad B. Khazen, “Censorship and State Control of the Press in the Arab World,” The Harvard 
International Journal of Press Politics 4.3, (1999) 87-92, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/harvard_international_journal_of_press_politics/v004/4.3khazen.html#authbio 
(accessed November 21, 2008). 
137 “The New Constitution: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” Arab Law Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1993), 258-
270, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3381589 (accessed February 10, 2008). 
 56
enforced such as in an incident with al-Hayat in August of 2007.  “The government 
confiscated copies of the Saudi daily al-Hayat, after one of its contributors criticized the 
health care system in the Kingdom.”138  Journalists are also controlled on an individual 
level.  All journalists must register with the Ministry of Information, and foreign 
journalists face visa obstacles and restrictions on their movement. The Ministry also 
controls the Saudi Journalists Association's governing board by allowing only approved 
candidates to run in its elections.”139  Despite the strict control over the press, Saudi 
Arabia has about a dozen daily papers. 
The restrictions on the press are harsh, but there is a cyclical nature to its 
treatment.  During the Gulf War of 2003, the Saudi papers were allowed to provide hard 
hitting articles on the war and critiques of American policy.  The Saudi government also 
allowed the papers to publish articles about the terrorists’ attacks on Saudi soil, which 
would generally have been blocked to shield the population from unrest in the 
Kingdom.140  The local newspapers have recently been allowed to print articles 
criticizing government policies.  The Arab News is the largest circulation English-
language newspaper in the region.  It has published articles such as “Lifting Ban on 
Women Driving Will Bring Economic Windfall: Experts,” which argues against the ban 
on women drivers by pointing out advantages to economy if women drove,141 and 
“Shattering Glass Ceilings at Lingerie Shops,” which criticized a law to hire women in 
lingerie shops that was not being implemented.142 
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 Even if the recent loosening of controls on the press is short lived, this 
demonstrates the willingness of the press to keep pushing the limits of censorship.  The 
press as an institution is vying for the excellence in reporting that exists in Western media 
outlets, but are held back by government intervention.  This in no way demonstrates the 
quality of the personnel working at newspapers.  This bodes well for the press as an 
institution that can function in a democracy if the shackles of censorship are ever lifted.  
The concept of a free press will be an evolutionary change because the censored press is 
already an established institution.  The evolutionary change will be a give and take 
process between reporters, editors, owners, and the government which will progress to 
meet market expectations.  The evolution will lead to a press that will report the news as 
its primary function, while considering the regime rather than sustaining it. 
E. THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
The international pressure is led by the US.  US pressure is palpable in the 
kingdom, but the pressure is met with both concessions and resistance.  Saudi Arabia is 
not a puppet of US interests, but they are a facilitator on most issues.143  The Saudi King 
supported the 1991 and 2003 Gulf War.  The 1991 war met a positive response in Saudi 
Arabia, but the mood changed for the 2003 invasion.144  The public saw the US as the 
protector in 1991 and the aggressor in 2003.  The Saudis were pressured to such an extent 
from radical elements in the Kingdom that their policy to support the American position 
had to be calculated to balance external security concerns with internal dissent.145  Their 
position was further complicated following terrorist attacks on Saudi soil.  The Saudis 
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have since supported anti-terrorist policies and espoused peaceful rhetoric.146  The Saudis 
have also supplied financial support to Iraq to help it rebuild in the wake of the 
American-led invasion.   
Saudi Arabia is also part of a number of regional alliances.  The Gulf Coast 
Council contains Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE and is a military and 
economic alliance.  The smaller countries on the peninsula are implementing political and 
economic liberal reforms, which pressures Saudi Arabia to make similar changes.  These 
countries are closely aligned with US foreign policy and most contain a US military base.  
Saudi Arabia is also a member country in the League of Arab States.  This organization 
aligns Arab nations in the Middle East and North Africa and is political in nature.147  
Saudi Arabia is the dominant member in OPEC and joined the World Trade Organization 
in 2005.148 These political and economic alliances exert pressure on Saudi Arabia to 
liberalize both its economic and governmental policies. 
F. SECURITY CONCERNS 
 The security concerns of Saudi Arabia have always been fueled by two main 
issues.  First, Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Middle East, which means that its 
borders are vast.  The population of Saudi Arabia was too small to provide adequate 
protection without drawing adversely from the population and the treasury.  The Gulf 
Cooperative Council was created in 1976 as an information resource to coordinate 
intelligence on “political dissidents.”149  The GCC was composed of Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Oman, Qatar, and UAE and their prime purpose was a security shield in the gulf from 
hostile countries.  The GCC were small and recognized their vulnerability to larger states 
such as Iraq and Iran.  The GCC states believe that a large population will give them 
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prestige in the international community. A larger population would also allows them to 
provide better defenses and also replace expatriate workers who may be sources of 
internal subversion.150  
Second, the military technological gap between Saudi Arabia and her regional 
threats have been large.  Egypt, Iran, and Iraq were all regional threats to Saudi Arabia at 
particular periods in history and either bought their weapons from international suppliers 
or developed indigenous production capabilities to supply their military needs.  Egypt 
was a threat in the 1960s because it espoused nationalism and promoted conflicts in 
Yemen that were evidence that they supported revolutionary coups.151  The threat of Iran 
came with the 1979 Shia revolution that placed an Islamic republic where a monarchy 
once stood.  This was another brand of revolutionary change that the Saudis saw as a 
threat because it was unfavorable to monarchical rule.152  Iraq formed a threat in 1990 
when it invaded Kuwait because it was in the vicinity of the Saudi oil fields.153  Each 
threat could have caused major problems in Saudi Arabia by funding insurrectionist 
movements within their borders so the Saudis had to deal with them by brokering deals 
with outside governments for arms, political support, and protection. 
The longest standing protection understanding is with the US.  Since the 
discovery of oil on the Saudi Peninsula, it has been in the national interest of the US to 
have the Saudi monarchy in charge in Saudi Arabia because they provided a stable, 
dependable regime.  They did not support all of America’s foreign policies, but they did 
have the same overall interest in keeping Saudi oil in royal hands.  One of the biggest 
areas of foreign policy disagreements has been the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The US 
has backed Israel, which is unpopular among most Muslim governments.  To be seen as 
both the custodians of the two Holy Cities, and dependent on the US relationship, was a 
contradiction that weakened Saudi political capital in the region.  Insurgencies conducted 
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in the region, such as that conducted by Hezbollah-backed Iran in Lebanon, forced Saudi 
Arabia to remain vigilant against similar threats.  These types of covert efforts, if allowed 
to take root inside Saudi Arabia’s vast kingdom, would undermine public order and could 
cost the al-Saud their kingdom because their citizens, or subjects, would see them as 
incapable of protecting the country.  For this reason, it was necessary for the Saudis to 
condone a political relationship with the US, despite the drawbacks.  To allow more 
flexibility in foreign policy, the Saudis have sought other patrons, such as China, to 
supply them with weapons.  Although regional threats exist, the al-Saud maintains 
diplomatic relationships with its enemies.  Iran is the biggest threat to Saudi Arabia 
presently, but they hold periodic conferences with Tehran and participate in political and 
economic committees together.154 The Saudis are firm believers in the adage “I against 
my brothers; I and my brothers against my cousins; I and my cousins against the 
world.”155 
G. ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 
 Extremist groups have also pressed the royal family to be more in line with 
mainstream international politics because the regime is threatened by internal subversion 
and needs international support to combat the threat.156  The Wahhabi form of Islam is 
stricter than most other Muslim sects and is thought to breed the jihadist doctrine of 
extremist groups.  This is dangerous for Saudis for two reasons.  First, Saudi Arabia 
prides itself on being the beacon for austere Islam around the world.  To have this 
reputation questioned by other Islamic groups risk the Islamic world seeing Saudi Arabia 
as an Islamic country in need of regime change to return it to its Islamic traditions.  The 
second threat has to do with security.  Because Saudi Arabia has such a strong religious 
heritage, the large numbers of young men in the country that are disillusioned by the 
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changing social and economic situations in the kingdom, make this combination a hotbed 
for extremist religious activity.  This places Saudi in a dangerous internal security 
situation which makes it necessary to conduct oppressive tactics to ensure the survival of 
the kingdom.  Because these measures have to be taken, this raises more human rights 
issues, which forces the king to push more and grant more political reforms to give, either 
genuinely or just for appearance, more political rights.  This fuels the evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary political changes that are occurring, even though the revolutionary 
threat is the impetus. 
H. OIL 
 The most important thing that forms the impetus for Saudi Arabia’s integration 
into the international community is its natural oil reserves: 
Saudi Arabia contains approximately 267 billion barrels of proven oil 
reserves amounting to around one-fifth of proven, conventional world oil 
reserves. Around two-thirds of Saudi reserves are considered "light," 
"extra light" or “super light” grades of oil, with the rest either "medium" 
or "heavy." Saudi Arabia maintains the world’s largest crude oil 
production capacity, estimated to be around 10.5 - 11 million bbl/d, at 
mid-year 2008.157 
All social, economic, and government advancements in the kingdom are due solely to the 
discovery of oil and it is the reason Saudi Arabia has matured into an economic power in 
the region.  Saudi Arabia is integrated into the global energy market and their main power 
is associated with the amount of oil they produce.  “The critical balancing act of Saudi 
foreign policy, therefore, is to maintain oil prices within a reasonable price band.”158  
Saudi Arabia wants prosperous countries that import oil to remain addicted so they try to 
keep prices at a level that under prices the competition, while trying to maintain oil prices 
at a level that will maximize revenue generation.  The 2008 economic downturn reversed 
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oil prices from a record $147 high to below $50 and Saudi Arabia began trying to use its 
influence in OPEC to arrest the decreasing price.   
 There is a symbiotic relationship between oil exporters and importers.   Saudi 
Arabia must deliver a reliable flow of oil and have the infrastructure to handle the 
financial transactions related to oil contracts.  These two factors have vastly improved the 
financial system, ports, and oil infrastructure which have influenced the financial 
institutions to operate as western style banks that deal with interest and interest like 
methods to conduct financial transactions.  The more liberal financial system introduces 
Saudis to Western style economics which leads to liberal political policies to support a 
healthy financial system. 
I. ASSESSMENT 
The oil boom in the early 1970s was both a blessing and a curse to Saudi Arabia.  
The blessing was the increased oil revenues that fueled the modernization projects in the 
state that improved the overall per capita income and living standards of the population.  
The curse was the rapid growth of the population.  Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure was not 
prepared for the increased numbers of citizens requiring education and jobs.  The result 
was an ill-equipped educational system frantically pumping out graduates that were not 
trained to meet the demands of the Saudi economy.  The 1970s generation did not have to 
worry about employment because the rapid growth of the government to meet the 
modernizing society supplied jobs while oil wealth supplied the revenues to pay for them.  
Once the “baby boom” generation reached the job market, however, modernization 
projects slowed, the population more than doubled, and the private sector of the economy 
could not supply enough jobs that suited the average Saudi citizen. 
 The Saudi population also entered an information age which ended the isolation 
of the society from the international community and revealed the lack of human freedoms 
and participation in government in comparison to those enjoyed by other countries in the 
modern world.  Even other GCC states were more progressive and their citizens enjoyed 
greater liberties and less intrusive government.  Islamic extremism invaded the kingdom 
and the press was allowed to report the unrest to the general population.  The eased 
censorship started with the 9/11 attacks in America and the subsequent invasion of Iraq.  
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In sum, the society demanded better training to meet the demands of the Saudi economy 
and more overall job availability, while the information age was portraying the political 
and economic “gap” with their counterparts in the rest of the developed world. 
 The Saudi government became aware of the shortfalls in the educational system 
and the job market and took steps to improve training to meet the demands of the job 
market and promote growth in the private sector.  The sixth development plan 
emphasized Saudization of jobs with more than 20 employees, which would decrease the 
expatriate population while increasing the number of Saudis in the job market.  The 
private sector did not welcome the changes because Saudi citizens demanded more pay 
for less work, and Saudi citizens did not want manual labor jobs.  Khaled al-Maeena, the 
Arab News’ editor-in-chief, stated that “all of our young people would like to be 
managers, which is absolutely nonsense.” This attitude reveals a need for a social 
evolution that young Saudis are slowly realizing.  They are beginning to understand that 
the government will not be able to take care of them like their parents and grandparents 
and it is a necessity, not a luxury, to gain employment as the government executes 
policies that will reduce its footprint in the job market and let the private sector solve the 
problem.  With the realization that the government will not be the same government as 
their parents knew, the Saudi citizens will realize that the bargain struck that left them out 
of the government as long as the government took care of them, no longer applies. 
The educational gains in the country have caused an expectation “gap” in the job 
market that will transfer to the political arena.  The government introduced elections on 
the municipality level for the first time in 2005, with discouraging turnout numbers, but 
elections on this level will continue and proceed to the national level.  Outside observers 
have the expectation that women will participate in the 2009 elections.  The low turnout 
reveals that Saudi citizens are not overly dissatisfied with the government’s performance.  
The elections were an anticipatory move by the government to meet greater demands by 
the citizens for greater involvement.  The elections are a tool to give Saudi citizens a 
greater voice in government so they will bear a portion of the country’s burden and not 
completely blame the al-Saud for the emerging problems.  Whether the liberal changes 
were genuine is not clear, but external pressure from security concerns, NGOs, and 
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mainstream international norms are positive pressures that will force the Saudi 
government to keep the meager liberal gains in place.  There is a modern Saudi saying, 
“If you didn’t become a Saudi in the days of King Abdulaziz, you will never be a Saudi.  
If you didn’t become rich during the days of King Khalid, you will never be rich.  If you 
didn’t become poor during the days of King Fahd, you will never be poor.”159  The next 
stage in this saying may be if you did not participate in the job market or vote under 
Abdullah, you never will. 
                                                 




The Basic Law was a major milestone in Saudi Arabian history.  It is not called a 
constitution, but it functionally acts as one.  The Basic Law establishes a contract 
between the King and the populace, but the document does not offer traditional freedoms 
such as freedom of the press or freedom of religion.  The Majlis al-Shura was also 
created by the Basic Law and offers a real chance for Saudi Arabia to create a legislative 
body, but as presently defined, it is merely an advisement panel with no authority to 
challenge the King.  The Basic Law also expanded the candidates eligible to become king 
and the Allegiance council created a body composed of the royal family to choose a king.  
These two developments solved the generational succession dilemma, but also opened an 
avenue to the throne for more princes.  The expansion of the eligible princes means that 
political talent and skillful alliance building will play a formal part in choosing the Saudi 
monarch and, for the first time, the family can place competent kings on the throne, rather 
than settle for the next prince in line.  These reforms, however, do not go into affect until 
Prince Sultan becomes king.  This means that the reforms may not survive King Abdullah 
or King Sultan if they have a more conservative view of governing.  The Majlis al-Shura, 
Allegiance Commission, and other reforms defined in the Basic Law are signs of 
democratic evolution because they are institutions created by the monarchy which 
codifies a process to solve challenges to the crown.  
There are political groups in Saudi Arabia that are aligned with reform policies 
and those that are strongly resistant to such changes.  Women, merchants, and technocrats 
support liberal reforms and act as conduits to international norms and liberal ideology.  
These groups have new avenues to congregate due to new technologies and they are 
using them to learn about international norms and disseminate liberal platforms in the 
kingdom.  Their participation in the government will increase to a level that will 
challenge the dominance of the religious establishment and provide an alternative power 
base for the king to implement reforms in the face of strong opposition from the 
conservatives.  The decline of tribal affiliations was the most important development 
toward cultivating individual identity rather than group identity.  The expatriates have not 
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played a significant political role, but they will provide labor until the Saudi educational 
system is able to train citizens to meet the demands of the job market. 
The royal family promotes policies that balance the needs of the religious 
conservative establishment with the needs of the reform minded political groups, while 
seeking to neutralize the more extreme elements of each.  The Saudi government is aware 
of the shortfalls in the educational system and the job market and is taking steps to 
improve training to meet the demands of the job market and promote growth in the 
private sector.  King Abdullah is labeled a reform minded king by harsh critics of the 
Saudi monarchy.160  He is battling against the conservative ulama and members of the 
royal family.  Although the gains have been small, he has brought elections to Saudi 
Arabia for the first time and generally looks to improve human rights.  He views Saudi 
Arabia, “in a sense, as a democracy now,”161 but many of the institutions that are 
hallmarks of a liberal society such as a free press, equality, and unmolested opposition to 
the government do not exist in the country.  The institutions developed under the 
authoritarian regime, however, are stable enough to support a transition to democracy 
without revolutionary assistance.  The economic institutions developed during the oil 
boom, the religious organization in the judicial system, and the civilian control of the 
military are a few of the institutions that already display some of the characteristics of 
liberal societies, but they need a governing body to hold them to a standard.  The standard 
was established in the Basic Law and the Majlis al-Shura is the next institution that must 
develop to fulfill the promise of the liberal reform.  In the words of King Abdullah: 
This government has shown versatility and permanence.  We have faced 
many problems.  When oil came in the 50s they said this country can not 
survive, because the wealth would change the underpinning of the 
economy.  But it is still here.  In the 60s when they were calling Nasser the 
wave of the future, Nasser went away and the government is still here.  
After the liberation of Kuwait and saying 100s of thousands of American 
troops existing in Saudi Arabia would surely mean the death nod of the 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  It is still here.162 
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If not this generation, then the next will see Saudi Arabia transform into a Constitutional 
Monarchy driven by the internal and external forces the vast oil wealth has created.  
Saudi Arabian history will always remember Muhammad ibn Saud and Abd-al-Aziz al 
Saud for their contributions in creating Saudi Arabia.  The next king that will be honored 
in the same vein as these historical figures is the King that gives Saudi Arabia to the 
Saudi citizens.  Despite the critics that foretold that the House of Saud would crumble, 
Saudi Arabia is still here, and the House of Saud will be there to lead it to the next phase 
of its existence. 
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